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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most interesting aspects of the common law of torts is the
way in which it necessarily combines what are often separate and fundamen-
tal aspects of other areas of jurisprudence. For example, two of the widely
accepted goals of tort law are the provision of increased compensation to
those who are injured and the generation of a deterrent to discourage harm-
producing behavior.' While these are both critically important social goods
produced by a properly functioning tort law system, the law of torts is not
the optimal legal approach to pursing either goal alone.
With its unique access to penal sanctions and the nearly guaranteed
mismatch in power and resources enjoyed by the government as prosecutor
as compared to the defense, criminal law is unquestionably a superior sys-
tem for deterring antisocial harm-producing behavior than the civil law of
tort.2 Similarly, most observers agree that reasonably well-designed systems
of social insurance and no-fault liability provide compensation to injured in-
dividuals on a more reliable basis and in a more efficient manner than does
traditional tort law.3
1. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 17, 19 (2000) ("Compensation of injured persons is one
of the generally accepted aims of tort law.... Courts and writers almost always recognize that
another aim of tort law is to deter certain kinds of conduct by imposing liability when that conduct
causes harm."); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (5th ed. 1984) ("'The purpose of the law of torts is
to adjust these losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of
the conduct of another."') (quoting Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMB. L. J.
238 (1944)).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (stating
that "the punishments imposed by the criminal law on people convicted of crime produce a powerful
deterrent effect"); see also ALBERT J. HARNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 1 (Callaghan and Co., 1939) ("The statement is commonly made and accepted that
criminal law began as private vengeance."); I CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §
3 (15th ed. 1993) (explaining two theories of deterrence, termed "special deterrence" (designed to
deter only the individual offender) and "general deterrence" (designed to deter the public as a whole
by making an example of the offender)). Compare with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901
(1965) (stating that the primary purpose of tort law is to "give compensation, indemnity, or restitu-
tion for harms") and Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives
Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 863 (1998) ("In contrast t[o] the criminal law, victim compensa-
tion is the chief purpose of tort law."). See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. While the purpose of
criminal law is to protect the public interest by punishing the criminal defendant through such me-
thods as permanent or temporary segregation from society, tort law is focused on compensating the
injured plaintiff at the expense of the defendant by imposing a money judgment. Id; Peter Cane,
Using Tort Law to Enforce Environmental Regulations?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 427, 442 (2002) ("The
importance of reparation in tort law and of punishment in criminal law partly explains why deter-
rence is widely viewed as a goal of the criminal justice system, but only as a by-product of the tort
system."); Markus Dirk Dubber, Making Sense of the Sense of Justice, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 815, 844
(2005) (noting how in criminal law, "the power differential between the state and the accused is no-
toriously steep . . . given the radically unequal bargaining positions of prosecutors and defendants.").
3. Willis v. Redfish Renovations, LLC, 2004-0968, pg. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/15/04); 891 So.2d
748, 750 (explaining how workers' compensation legislation was enacted as a form of social insur-
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After repeated attempts over many years, however, criminal law has
proven to be exceptionally resistant to including any meaningful compensa-
tion for the victims of crime in its regular processes. Thus, while criminal
law is clearly the superior legal system for generating effective deterrence, it
is a very poor means of providing victim compensation. Similarly, while
systems of risk-pooling and social insurance generally offer compensation in
a more efficient fashion, they frequently fail to generate much effective de-
terrence to harm producing behavior.6 When techniques like the adjustment
of premiums based on risk rating and loss experience are employed in an ef-
fort to increase deterrence, efficiency rapidly declines. In general, the com-
ance "to compensate victims of industrial accidents because it was widely believed that the limited
rights of recovery under tort law were inadequate to protect these individuals."); Timothy J. Murphy,
A Policy Analysis of a Successor Corporation's Liability for its Predecessor's Defective Products
When the Successor Has Acquired the Predecessor's Assets for Cash, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 837
(1988) ("Social insurance would be more efficient in cost-spreading than our tort system, because
social insurance simplifies the plaintiffs burden of proof to merely that of proving the extent of its
accidental injuries."); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholar-
ship, 80 CAL. L. REv. 889, 922 (1992) (noting how "imprecise and expensive tort law is as a com-
pensation scheme, and how many more people could be compensated through social insurance.").
4. See Berman, supra note 2, at 863 ("The purpose of the criminal law is not principally com-
pensatory. It serves retributive, deterrent, incapacitative, and rehabilitative goals that are not compa-
rably well served by monetary ... settlement between offender and victim."); Jay Tidmarsh, A
Process Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1313, 1338 (1994) ("[A] concern for loss alloca-
tion distinguishes torts from criminal law, which deals with societal punishment for actual or threat-
ened harm . . . .").
5. See J.R. v. State, 62 P.3d 114, 119 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (explaining how criminal law
"emphasizes punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation of the individual criminal defendant, rather
than focusing on compensation for the injured victim"); State v. Newman, 623 A.2d 1355, 1358
(N.J. 1993) (noting how over time, "the significance of victim compensation [has] diminished as a
goal of the criminal law and [has] bec[o]me instead a principal focus of the civil law."); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 1, at 7 ("[A] criminal prosecution is not concerned directly with compensation of the
injured individual against whom the crime is committed, and the victim's only formal part in it is
that of an accuser and a witness for the state. So far as the criminal law is concerned, the victim will
leave the courtroom empty-handed."); Pamela S. Karlan, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea:
The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 116-17 (1983) ("[C]riminal law does
not attempt to restore victims to the position they occupied before the commission of the crime; ra-
ther, it leaves such attempts to civil tort actions or victim compensation statutes."); Peter Tiersma,
The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 57 (1995) (highlighting that the primary difference
between tort law and criminal law is that "tort law awards compensation to the victim, while crimi-
nal law seeks to punish the wrongdoer on behalf of society.").
6. James A. Henderson, Jr., Extending the Boundaries ofStrict Products Liability: Implications
of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036, 1041 n.19 (1980) ("[W]hen cost spread-
ing in the form of social insurance is pursued as an end in itself, it undermines the general deterrence
objective."); Antoinette D. Paglia, Taking the Tort Out of Court-Administrative Adjudication of
Medical Liability Claims: Is it the Next Step?, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 41, 65 n.176 (1991) (explaining
how, in the context of healthcare litigation, social insurance would result in "the evaporation of
whatever deterrence the tort process provides").
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pensatory superiority of such systems compared to tort law is only clearly
maintained so long as deterrence is either weakly generated or not generated
at all.
Thus, while tort law is not the superior legal system for generating either
compensation or deterrence alone, one of its special virtues is the way in
which it combines both compensation and deterrence in the simple act of
forcing a transfer of assets from the harm producer to the victim.' Arguably,
no other legal regime so effectively provides both compensation and deter-
rence in such an elegant fashion. Indeed, the scheme of liability created by
the common law of torts can be characterized as largely attaching to situa-
tions, and only those situations, in which both compensation and deterrence
are likely to result from the imposition of liability.
There is another very interesting way in which traditional tort law com-
bines two different types of fundamental legal approaches that are, in isola-
tion, most typically associated with other areas of jurisprudence. These two
approaches can be labeled as unilateral analysis and bilateral analysis.
The second section of this article describes unilateral, or one-party,
analysis and its traditional association with criminal law. 9 It also illustrates
the use of classic unilateral analysis in the law of torts, specifically in the de-
finition of intent for the intentional torts.'o
In Part III, the limitations of unilateral analysis in tort law are demon-
strated." While important and valuable in dealing with some tort law issues,
unilateral analysis is an inadequate basis for approaching other critical doc-
trinal issues. One such issue involves the regulation of an essentially com-
municative, even if entirely nonverbal, transaction between the plaintiff and
the defendant, as in cases of consent and self-defense.12
When confronted with these kinds of problems, tort law must abandon
classic unilateral analysis and instead adopt a two-party, or bilateral, analysis
7. See Frank B. Cross, America the Adversarial, 89 VA. L. REV. 189, 222 (2003) ("[Tlhere is
strong reason to expect to find deterrence benefits from tort law, benefits that would be reduced by a
shift to compensation from social insurance."); Michael J. Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-
Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability
Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 929, 971-72 (1987) ("Deterrence objectives with respect to
employers and employees are not central to [workers' compensation] systems."); Ralph A. Winter,
The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455,
465 (1988) (arguing that "the trend in the U.S. tort system [has been] towards the pursuit of the
compensation or social insurance objective of tort law and away from the deterrence objective").
8. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Necessity and the Logic of Strict Liability, in ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. and the Doctrine of Necessity, Article 5
(2005), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss7/art5 (noting "the now conventional notion that tort law
serves the purposes of deterrence and compensation").
9. See infra text accompanying notes 22-28.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 30-38.
I1. See infra text accompanying notes 39-58,
12. See infra text accompanying notes 39-78.
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of the sort traditionally associated with contract law.13 This blending of un-
ilateral and bilateral analysis, even within the relatively circumscribed world
of the intentional torts, is an essential characteristic of tort law, just like the
composite of deterrence and compensation that constitutes its basic goals.
Part IV of this article introduces the notion of a second kind of bilateral
analysis that also exists and serves as an important component of tort law.14
This second kind of bilateral analysis arises from the fact that the dominant
legal remedy in tort law-the involuntary transfer of assets from the defen-
dant to the plaintiff-both imposes an unwelcome burden upon the defen-
dant and confers a material benefit on the plaintiff. Thus tort law, in contrast
to criminal law, must be concerned with imposing liability not only in situa-
tions where the defendant's behavior is worthy of deterrence, but also in sit-
uations in which the plaintiff is deserving of compensation.
This need to be mindful of both the defendant's and the plaintiffs sta-
tuses with respect to the appropriate imposition of a legal remedy creates
considerable complexity in the proper design of some tort law doctrine. This
aspect of tort law is illustrated through an analysis of situations in which a
plaintiff subjectively consented to a defendant's otherwise intentionally tor-
tious behavior but did not effectively communicate that consent to the de-
fendant.' 5 This second kind of bilateral analysis also has a powerful influ-
ence on the doctrinal treatment of cases in which the defendant has
reasonably responded in self-defense to a threat of imminent bodily harm
that was innocently generated by the plaintiff.'6
Because of the inherently bilateral nature of the legal remedy in tort law,
it is not appropriate to simply adopt the general principle that liability will
never be imposed unless the defendant is fully deserving of liability and the
plaintiff is also fully deserving of compensation. 7 After all, a decision not
to impose liability is a detriment to a deserving plaintiff in much the same
way as a decision to impose liability is a detriment to the defendant. Recog-
nizing this, tort law has developed doctrines that impose liability on defen-
dants who have not engaged in antisocial or blameworthy behavior.1 8
One such doctrine operates in circumstances in which the defendant has
intentionally harmed the plaintiff in a reasonable response to a threat of im-
13. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 81-105.
15. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 39-65 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 106-34 and accompanying text.
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minent bodily harm posed by someone other than the plaintiff.1 9 Another
example is the limited privilege offered by the doctrine of private necessi-
ty.20 In both of these instances, one can clearly see the presence of strict lia-
bility, not as a modem movement fundamentally challenging the fault-based
paradigm of traditional tort law, but instead existing comfortably within the
context of the intentional torts; a natural consequence of tort law's unique
blend of unilateral and bilateral analysis.2 1
Part VI concludes the article.
II. UNILATERAL ANALYSIS IN TORT LAW
Unilateral analysis refers to basic problems of regulating the legal status
of a single person, be it a natural or a legal person. The classic area of law
that deals in unilateral analysis is criminal law, where the liability and pu-
nishment of the criminal defendant is the primary focus.2 2  This does not
mean that criminal law looks only to the defendant when engaging in its
task. Often, the effect of the defendant's behavior on another will play a
critical role in the determination of the particular crime for which the defen-
dant may be liable-as in the difference between attempted homicide and
homicide-or driving under the influence and negligent manslaughter.2 3
Sometimes the behavior of another will determine the criminal quality of the
defendant's actions, as in the case of a defendant engaging in what would
otherwise be an assault while in the process of protecting another from im-
minent attack.24
19. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 110-2 1and accompanying text.
22. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 9 (1947). In discussing the rules of
criminal law, Hall states "[t]he union of these elements results in judgments signifying that upon the
occurrence of the described harms, the specified punishments must be applied to the offenders." Id.;
see JUSTIN MILLER, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 18-19 (1934) ("It has been said that the purpose
of criminal law is to punish offenders."); TORCIA, supra note 2, § I ("The criminal law attempts to
force obedience .. .by punishing offenders.").
23. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36.1(A) (2009) (stating that "[a]ny person who, as a result of
driving under the influence ... unintentionally causes the death of another person, shall be guilty of
involuntary manslaughter") (emphasis added)). Under Virginia law, "[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is
punishable as a Class 5 felony." VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-36. Compare with id. §18.2-266 (stating
"[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle ... while such person has
a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.08 grams or more
per 210 liters of breath as indicated by a chemical test administered as provided in this article") (em-
phasis added)). Under Virginia law, driving under the influence is a Class I misdemeanor. Id.
§ 18.2-270. See generally TORCIA, supra note 2, at 7 ("[1]f a person operates his motor vehicle reck-
lessly or while intoxicated, he is guilty of a crime and may be imprisoned, but if there is no vic-
tim .. . the driver is not liable in tort.").
24. See WILLIAM LAWRENCE CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CRIMES § 259 (3d ed. 1927) ("It is well settled that a parent has the right to use necessary force in
defense of his child, and vice versa. The same is true of husband and wife, brothers and sisters, and
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In each of these cases, though, criminal law looks to the consequences
suffered, or the actions taken, by someone other than the criminal defendant
in an effort to establish the criminal liability of the defendant.25 What does
the extent of the harm suffered by the victim mean for the degree of criminal
culpability of the defendant?26 And, to what extent does the threat posed by
the victim to another, whom the defendant sought to protect, exonerate the
defendant for the assault on the victim?27 In these circumstances, the inquiry
as to others is only relevant to the extent that it sheds light on the legal status
of the criminal defendant. 28 This is classic unilateral legal analysis.
master and servant."); see also Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Com-
parative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 405 (2005) ("A whole group of de-
fenses (self-defense, defense of another and defense of property) are based on the unlawful harm
about to be inflicted on the defendant by the putative victim.... What a person may do in self-
defense depends to a large degree on what the aggressor attempted to do to that person; i.e., the
scope of justified behavior is fundamentally determined by the acts of the victim.").
25. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 14 (3d ed. 2000) ("[A]n injured party may condone
the tort committed against him; but a victim of crime may not normally obliterate the commission of
the crime by forgiving the criminal.... [I]n the case of crimes based on negligence (e.g., criminal
homicide, battery) the contributory negligence of the victim is no defense (although ... the conduct
of the victim is often important in determining whether the defendant was culpably negligent)."
(footnote omitted)).
26. For example, the Model Penal Code defines criminal homicide-which includes murder,
manslaughter, and negligent homicide-in terms of the severity of the harm inflicted on the victim:
"A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes
the death of another human being." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (1985). Similarly, "[a] person
is guilty of assault if he: (a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily
injury to another; or (b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (c) at-
tempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury." Id. § 211.1(1).
27. See LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 501. ("The prevailing rule is that one is justified in using rea-
sonable force in defense of another person, even a stranger, when he reasonably believes that the
other is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and that the use of such
force is necessary to avoid this danger."); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (Use of Force for the Protec-
tion of Other Persons).
28. See HARNO, supra note 2, at 6 ("No account whatever is taken of what are now referred to as
extenuating circumstances .... Consequences alone are considered."). Similarly, the "guilt" of the
victim is not a bar in finding the defendant liable. See State v. Crace, 289 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn.
1979) ("It is well settled that the contributory negligence of the victim is never a defense to a crimi-
nal prosecution."); MILLER, supra note 22 at 22-23 (explaining that "neither the guilt of the injured
person nor his contributory negligence avoids criminal liability upon the part of the accused.... On
the other hand, each of the considerations just mentioned may avoid liability in tort." (footnotes
omitted)); Bergelson, supra note 24 at 397 ("Criminal law .. . has explicitly rejected the idea of con-
tributory fault. Courts are unanimous that, unless it is the sole proximate cause of the resulting
harm, the victim's conduct is irrelevant."); Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to Phi-
losophical Criticisms of the Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 439-40
(2004) ("In fact, criminal law is devoid of many of the formal legal mechanisms contained in tort
law that address the complex nature of victims' contributions to injurious transactions.").
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Given their mutual history in English common law and the fact that both
areas of jurisprudence are fundamentally about identifying undesirable harm
producing behavior and imposing an unwanted legal consequence on those
who engage in it, one might expect tort law to share with criminal law a do-
minant focus on unilateral analysis. 29 Criminal law doctrine is designed to
answer the questions: Should the defendant be found guilty and, if so, what
should be the appropriate punishment imposed upon him? Similarly, tort
law doctrine could be expected to be designed to answer the questions:
Should the defendant be found liable and, if so, how much should he be re-
quired to pay?
It is therefore unsurprising to find, upon inspection, that tort law does in
fact engage in classic unilateral analysis. An example of unilateral analysis
in tort law is the requirement of intent that exists in all of the intentional
torts.30 In order to satisfy this intent requirement for any intentional tort, a
plaintiff must establish that the defendant engaged in harm-producing beha-
vior with the purpose of violating the plaintiffs interest or with knowledge
to a substantial certainty that such a violation would result.3'
The first option offered by the definition of intent is straightforward but
not always easy. The purpose or desire that the defendant entertained while
engaging in the harm-producing act is, after all, a deeply internal state of
mind possessed by him alone.32 The defendant has little incentive to confess
29. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 29 ("The action of trespass, which first emerged in the
thirteenth century, had a basic criminal character .... It was in connection with this criminal pro-
ceeding that damages first came to be awarded incidentally to the injured plaintiff. What similarity
remains between tort and crime is to be traced to this common beginning.").
30. Alan Calnan, The Fault(s) in Negligence Law, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 695, 726 (2007) ("In-
tentional torts are premised on the display of a wrongful subjective intent."); Scott Fruehwald, The
Boundary of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Effects Test" and the Protection of Crazy Horse's Name,
38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 381, 429 (2004) ("All the intentional torts .. . contain the necessary ele-
ment of intent.. . .").
31. Reeves v. Structural Pres. Sys., 98-1795, pg. 3 (La. 3/12/99); 731 So. 2d 208, 211 (explaining
how intent means that "'the person who acts either . .. consciously desires the physical result of his
act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or ... knows that the result is
substantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result" (quot-
ing Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 481 (La. 1981))); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A
(1965) (stating that use of the word intent "denote[s] that [an] actor desires to cause consequences of
his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it"); KEETON
ET AL., supra note 1, at 35 (discussing how intent "extends not only to those consequences which are
desired, but also to those which the actor believes are substantially certain to follow from what the
actor does"); William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and Throwing Out Proof Structures: It Is
Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 361, 389 (1998) ("[Ilt is
basic blackletter law that the intent that is necessary to prove an intentional tort can be established by
proving either that the tortfeasor had the purpose to produce the results . .. or that the tortfeasor
knew to a substantial certainty that the results would be produced .... ).
32. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 35 (describing intent as a state of mind); Adam Candeub,
Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 2071, 2075 (1994) (describing intent
and purpose, in the context of criminal law, as a "psychological qualit[y] that require[s] inquiry into
212
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to such a purpose in the context of pending or active litigation if any plausi-
ble alternative explanation is available.
Given this, a plaintiff facing the burden of satisfying the intent element
of an intentional tort is provided an alternative to directly proving the pur-
pose or desire of the defendant.34 Pursuant to the substantial certainty
branch of the definition, a plaintiff may satisfy the intent element by making
use of a circumstantial syllogism. 35  The major premise of the syllogism is
that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have known
to a substantial certainty that the actions engaged in by the defendant would
cause harm to the plaintiff.36 The minor premise is that the defendant is not
significantly different from a reasonable person.37 The conclusion of the syl-
logism is that the defendant therefore knew to a substantial certainty that,
under the circumstances, the defendant's actions would result in harm to the
plaintiff.38
the internal state of a defendant's mind"); Ruth Gana Okediji, Status Rules: Doctrine as Discrimina-
tion in a Post-Hicks Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 49, 69 (1998) (stating how one branch of
the intent definition "refers to a state of mind regarding an act or omission with a purpose or desire
to bring about given consequences").
33. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 36 ("Since intent is a state of mind, it is plainly incorrect for
a court to instruct a jury that an actor is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of
the actor's conduct . . . .").
34. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 48 ("The defendant has an intent to achieve a specified result when
the defendant either (1) has a purpose to accomplish that result or (2) lacks such a purpose but knows
to a substantial certainty that the defendant's actions will bring about the result."); see Frey v. Kouf,
484 N.W.2d 864 (S.D. 1992); Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
35. Estep v. Rieter Auto. N. Am., Inc., 148 Ohio App. 3d 546, 774 N.E.2d 323, 326-27 (explain-
ing how proof that a defendant knew with substantial certainty that harm to the plaintiff would result
"often must be demonstrated through circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from the evi-
dence"); City of Keller v. Wilson, 86 S.W.3d 693, 704 (Tex. App. 2002), rev d, 168 S.W.3d 693
(Tex. 2005) ("Because defendants will rarely admit knowing to a substantial certainty that given
results would follow from their actions, triers of fact are free to discredit defendants' protestations
that no harm was intended and to draw inferences necessary to establish intent."); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 36 ("[I]t is correct [for a court] to tell the jury that, relying on circumstantial evi-
dence, they may infer that the actor's state of mind was the same as a reasonable person's state of
mind would have been.").
36. Bakerman v. Bombay Co., 961 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2007) ("Under an objective test for the
substantial certainty standard, an analysis of the circumstances in a case would be required to deter-
mine whether a reasonable person would understand that the [defendant's] conduct was 'substantial-
ly certain' to result in injury or death to the [plaintiff]." (quoting Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d
683, 688 (Fla. 2000))); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 36 (explaining how one element of the sub-
stantial certainty syllogism is that "given the circumstances disclosed in the evidence, a reasonable
person in the actor's position would have known that the consequence in question was substantially
certain to follow the act").
37. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 36 (describing the minor premise as being that "the actor
was even brighter and shrewder than most others.").
38. Id. at 36 (stating that if a finder of fact accepts the inferences of the syllogism, then the intent
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Use of this substantial certainty syllogism allows the plaintiff to intro-
duce evidence of the defendant's behavior, move the judge or jury to an in-
ference about the defendant's knowledge, and finally move the trier of fact
to the desired conclusion regarding the defendant's intent. In this manner,
the plaintiff has a plausible path from the external and observable-the de-
fendant's actions-to the wholly internal-the defendant's intent.
III. THE LIMITS OF UNILATERAL ANALYSIS AND THE ADOPTION OF
BILATERAL ANALYSIS
A. Consent
A similar issue arises in the area of the intentional tort privilege of con-
sent. 39 It is a well-established doctrine of tort law that a plaintiff shown to
have consented to the defendant's otherwise intentionally tortious behavior
may not subsequently obtain legal damages from the defendant for the harm
caused by that behavior.40 In other words, the consent of the plaintiff serves
as a privilege, or a defense, to an intentional tort claim. 41
element of an intentional tort is satisfied); see Kathy Seward Northern, Battery and Beyond: A Tort
Law Response to Environmental Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 485, 574
(1997) ("[W]hen a reasonable person in the actor's position would believe that a harmful or offen-
sive contact was substantially certain to follow, he will be dealt with as though he had intended that
result.").
39. This is reflected in the Latin maxim "volenti non fit injuria," meaning "to one who is willing,
no wrong is done." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A, cmt. a (1965); 1 EDWIN A.
JAGGARD, HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS ON TORTS 199 (St. Paul, Minn., West 1895).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A ("One who effectively consents to conduct
of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for
harm resulting from it."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 112 ("Consent ordinarily bars recovery for
intentional interferences with person or property."); FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 79 (The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1933) ("[T]here exists a general policy of the law that
one who has himself given full and complete assent to a course of conduct on the part of another and
thus, in a sense, participated in bringing about his damage, has sustained no legal wrong by harms
resulting from such conduct.").
41. See McAdams v. Windham, 94 So. 742, 743 (Ala. 1922) ("It is a general rule of law that a
blow thus inflicted in a friendly, mutual combat-a mere sporting contest-is not unlawfully in-
flicted, the parties being engaged in the violation of no law. 'Harm suffered by consent is not, in
general, the basis of a civil action."' (quoting I JAGGARD, supra note 39, at 199)); McNeil v. Mullin,
79 P. 168, 169 (Kan. 1905) ("'Consent is generally a full and perfect shield, when that is complained
of as a civil injury which was consented to. A man cannot complain of a nuisance, the erection of
which he concurred in or countenanced."' (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 187 (CHICAGO, CALLAGHAN & CO. 1888)); Howland v. George F. Blake Mfg. Co., 31
N.E. 656, 658 (Mass. 1892) ("If the defendant is guilty of no wrong against the plaintiff except a
wrong invited and procured by the plaintiff... it would be most unjust that the procurer of the
wrongful act should be permitted to profit by it."). See generally Ford v. Ford, 10 N.E. 474, 475
(Mass. 1887) ("A desertion consented to is not a desertion.... On like principles, the absence of
lawful consent is part of the definition of an assault ..... (internal citations omitted)).
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The plaintiffs consent to what would otherwise be an intentional tort
can come in the form of an explicit statement by the plaintiff, either written
or oral.42 Consent in this form is generally referred to as express consent.43
Consent can also occur in the absence of any explicit statement by the plain-
tiff." In these circumstances, it is the non-verbal behavior of the plaintiff
that triggers consent, and consent in this form is generally referred to as im-
plied consent.45
How can implied consent be established? At one level, the challenge of
designing a doctrinal test for implied consent is quite similar to the task of
designing a doctrinal test for the existence of intent. Both undertakings in-
volve crafting a test that permits a party to establish what is essentially an
interior mental state of another.46  As such, one might think that the ap-
proach used successfully in the area of intent could also be effectively em-
ployed with respect to implied consent.
Such an approach would provide the party seeking to establish implied
consent with a syllogism similar to the one available for intent based on sub-
stantial certainty. The major premise would be that a reasonable person in
the position of the plaintiff who engaged in the same behavior under the
same circumstances as did the plaintiff, would have been indicating consent
to the defendant's otherwise harm producing behavior.47 The minor premise
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892, cmt. b ("Normally [consent] is manifested
directly to the other by words or acts that are intended to indicate that it exists."); see also Quinn v.
Ltd. Exp., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 127, 130 (W.D. Pa. 1989) ("Consent may be manifested by an individ-
ual's words and/or affirmative actions which indicate a willingness for another's conduct to occur.").
43. See Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Express consent may be
given by words or affirmative conduct... ."); Schall v. Vazquez, 322 F. Supp. 2d 594, 601-02 (E.D.
Pa. 2004) (stating same).
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892, cmt. b ("[Consent] may equally be manifested
by silence or inaction, if the circumstances or other evidence indicate that the silence or inaction is
intended to give consent."); see also Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1158 (10th Cir. 2006)
("[C]onsent does not always need to be verbal . . . ."); McNeil, 79 P. at 169 ("Consent to engage in
mutual combat may be inferred from circumstances."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 113 ("Con-
sent may therefore be manifested by words, or by the kind of actions which often speak louder than
words.").
45. See Barnes, 161 F.3d at 148 ("[llmplied consent may be manifested when a person takes no
action, indicating an apparent willingness for the conduct to occur."); Schall, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 602
(stating same); Quinn, 715 F. Supp. at 130 ("Consent also may be indicated by inaction which indi-
cates to another an implied or apparent willingness for conduct to occur. In effect, the individual's
actions speak louder than words." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892, cmt. c. ("[Implied consent exists] when the
words or acts or silence and inaction, would be understood by a reasonable person as intended to
indicate consent and they are in fact so understood by the other.... [This] manifestation of apparent
consent ... justifies the other in acting on the assumption that consent is given and is as effective to
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would be that the plaintiff is not significantly different from such a reasona-
ble person.48 The conclusion of the syllogism would be that the plaintiff
therefore consented to the defendant's actions under the circumstances.4 9
By this inferential means, much like in intent, a defendant can begin
with an account of the plaintiff s external, observable behavior and end with
a conclusion regarding the plaintiffs internal mental state. In this case, the
desired conclusion is that the plaintiff consented to the defendant's other-
wise tortious actions.
Experience and reflection, however, indicate that this straightforward
translation of the syllogism for intent does not work as well with respect to
the issue of consent. Consider a situation in which a man makes an ap-
pointment and then shows up at the physician's office at the agreed upon
time. The patient proceeds to an examination room and describes his symp-
toms to the doctor. The doctor tells the patient, "I believe that you need a
shot of penicillin. That should work just fine. Are you allergic to penicil-
lin?" The patient replies, "No." The doctor then leaves the room.
Once the doctor leaves, the patient begins to doubt his answer. He va-
guely remembers being told of a bad reaction that he suffered as a child to an
injection of an antibiotic, but he is unable to remember the name of the drug.
He grows increasingly uncertain and anxious. He tells himself that he must
mention this to the doctor before the doctor injects him with penicillin.
As the patient is lost deep in thought, a nurse enters the room carrying a
tray with a syringe. The patient vaguely notices the nurse and the syringe
and absently rolls up his sleeve to present his arm to the nurse. The nurse
injects him with penicillin. The patient experiences a severe allergic reac-
tion to the penicillin and requires hospitalization before he recovers.
The patient subsequently sues the physician for the intentional tort of
battery. When asked about his possible consent to the penicillin injection,
prevent liability in tort as if there were consent in fact."); see also Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336
F.3d 1194, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003) ("'If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be
intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact."' (quot-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(1) (1965))); O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266,
266 (Mass. 1891) (holding that by waiting in line where women were being vaccinated, and in hold-
ing out her arm to the surgeon administering the vaccinations, a plaintiff in any other situation would
be thought to have consented); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 113 ("The defendant is entitled to
rely upon what any reasonable man would understand from the plaintiffs conduct."); HARPER, su-
pra note 40, at 81 ("The consent may be given either by word or conduct of such a character as to
lead a reasonable person to believe that an assent was expressed. The defendant may rely upon and
be guided by the overt acts and conduct of the plaintiff." (footnote omitted)).
48. See O'Brien, 28 N.E. at 266 (holding that the defendant was justified in believing that plain-
tiff, in line with arm exposed, consented to receiving the vaccination); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1,
at 113 ("The defendant is entitled to rely upon what any reasonable man would understand from the
plaintiff's conduct.").
49. See Escue, 450 F.3d at 1158 ("[Defendant] could have proved consent by showing that
[plaintiff] led him reasonably to believe that she consented to his contact . . . ."); see also discussion
supra, notes 46-48.
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the patient, now the plaintiff, explains that he was trying to probe his memo-
ry about the earlier incident and was lost deep in thought. He was anxious
and confused. He had assumed, and it was fixed in his mind, that it was the
doctor who would return to the room and give him the penicillin shot. He
was focusing on the doctor's return and reminding himself to tell the doctor
about his concerns before the doctor gave him the injection. He was not sure
what he thought the nurse was doing-maybe a vitamin shot or some sort of
anesthetic-but he certainly did not think that it was penicillin. He would
never have rolled up his sleeve and offered his arm if he thought that it was
penicillin.
The plaintiff is sincere and credible. Many persons who hear his expla-
nation are likely to believe him.
Under these circumstances, would it be appropriate to read to the jury an
instruction on consent similar to the translated intent syllogism described
above? Should the jury be asked to determine if a reasonable person in the
position of the plaintiff, plagued with doubts about his allergic status to pe-
nicillin, nervous and confused, preoccupied with the return of the doctor,
and feeling physically ill, might have rolled up his sleeve and presented his
arm to the nurse without intending to consent to a penicillin injection?
The answer is no. The use of the translated intent syllogism is not ap-
propriate here because a neutral decision-maker might well decide that,
based on this doctrinal test, consent did not exist in these circumstances and
that consent should clearly be found to exist. In fact, this should be a rela-
tively easy case of consent to a claim of battery brought by the patient
against the doctor.so
Why is this such an easy case? Because a finding that consent did not
exist in these circumstances would result in the defendant physician being
liable to the patient for the intentional tort of battery."' And while the physi-
50. See O'Brien, 28 N.E. at 266-67. In O'Brien, the plaintiff brought a charge of assault against
the Cunard Steam-Ship Company after having been vaccinated while traveling from Queenstown to
Boston. Id. at 266. Relying on the doctrine of implied consent to dismiss the plaintiff's claim, the
court found it necessary to examine the defendant doctor's conduct "in connection with the sur-
rounding circumstances," stating that "[i]f the plaintiff's behavior was such as to indicate consent on
her part, [the surgeon] was justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings may have been."
Id. This implied consent could be obtained by the surgeon "only by [observing] her overt acts and
the manifestations of her feelings." Id.
51. See Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 425 F.3d 126, 134
(2d Cir. 2005) (holding that under New York law, "battery applies in the medical context only where
the patient or her guardian gives no consent"); Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
("We think there can be no doubt that a surgical operation is a technical battery, regardless of its
results, and is excusable only when there is express or implied consent by the patient; or, stated
somewhat differently, the surgeon is liable in damages if the operation is unauthorized."); see also
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cian, through the nurse as an agent, did in fact intentionally inject the patient
with penicillin and thereby caused him significant harm, the physician did
not engage in the kind of intentional antisocial behavior that typically trig-
gers intentional tort liability. 52 The physician and the nurse reasonably be-
lieved that the patient consented to the injection of penicillin and reasonably
responded. They were understandably unaware of the lack of genuine con-
sent by the patient and as a result they should not be held liable to him. 3
The underlying difference between the problem of determining the exis-
tence of intent and determining the existence of consent is the difference be-
tween unilateral analysis and one kind of bilateral analysis. The search for
intent is an attempt to determine as accurately as possible the actual internal
mental state of the defendant at a particular time and place.54 Because an
admission of intent in the context of an intentional tort action is obviously
against the defendant's self-interest, the defendant's report as to his intent is
inherently unreliable.55 Thus, inferential devices like the substantial certain-
ty syllogism are required. Nevertheless, the use of the inferential syllogism
remains in service in an effort to be accurate about the actual existence of
intent by the defendant.
In contrast, the problem of determining whether the plaintiff consented
to the defendant's actions is less an attempt to accurately determine the ac-
Van Leeuwan v. Nuzzi, 810 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding that under Colorado law, bat-
tery cannot occur unless a physician obtained no consent for the procedures); Schloendorff v. Soc'y
of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("[A] surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."); Anthony Szczygiel,
Beyond Informed Consent, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 171, 184-85 (1994) ("[W]here the surgeon operat-
ed on a part of the body other than one discussed with the patient, there was liability for battery. The
central issue is whether an intentional 'touching' occurred. If so, and there was no express or im-
plied consent, there is liability." (footnotes omitted)).
52. See HARPER, supra note 40, at 3 8-39 . Harper states that the illegality of battery stems not
only from an interest in the freedom from bodily harm, but also in the freedom from "offensive"
touching, regardless of whether or not it results in harm. Id. An action is offensive, according to
Harper, if it "offends the reasonable sense of personal dignity usually respected in a civilized com-
munity." Id. at 38. Generally, the administration of penicillin by a doctor is not considered offen-
sive to one's personal dignity. See also Courtney v. Kneib, 110 S.W. 665, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908)
("[Merely laying one's hands on another does] not constitute an assault and battery. In order to have
made it such, the act must have been accompanied with anger or some other circumstance of the
kind evincing hostility."); I THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 232(CHICAGO, CALLAGHAN & CO. 1888) ("The wrong here consists, not in the touching, so much as in
the manner or spirit in which it is done . . . .").
53. See Mink v. Univ. of Chi., 460 F. Supp. 713, 718 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding that if a "patient
has assented to the doctor's treatment, he may not later maintain an action in battery").
54. In articulating the meaning of intent, the Restatements focus on the conduct of an individual,
rather than on interactions between individuals, stating that "[t]he word 'intent' is used throughout
the Restatement . . . to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he be-
lieves that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 8A (1965) (emphasis added).
55. See discussion supra Part II.
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tual internal state of mind of the plaintiff than it is an effort to regulate a
communicative interaction between the plaintiff and the defendant-a clas-
sic bilateral problem. Unlike the intent element, the privilege of consent
deals with situations in which the defendant claims that his otherwise tor-
tious behavior was undertaken in response to and in reliance upon the plain-
tiff's consent to that behavior. Thus, the focus of analysis in consent is not
solely the internal state of one party, as with intent, but the two-party inte-
raction between the plaintiff and the defendant.
This shift from a unilateral to a bilateral analysis can make all the differ-
ence. Consider a situation in which the plaintiffs actual internal state of
mind with respect to consent-the plaintiffs subjective consent-is fairly
determinable, but the communication of that consent to the defendant is im-
56. See Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Express consent may be
given by words or affirmative conduct and implied consent may be manifested when a person takes
no action, indicating an apparent willingness for the conduct to occur."); Quinn v. Ltd. Exp., Inc.,
715 F. Supp. 127, 130 (W.D. Pa. 1989) ("Consent may be manifested by an individual's words
and/or affirmative actions which indicate a willingness for another's conduct to occur. Consent also
may be indicated by inaction which indicates to another an implied or apparent willingness for con-
duct to occur. In effect, the individual's actions speak louder than words."); McNeil v. Mullin, 79 P.
168, 169 (Kan. 1905) ("Consent ... may be inferred from circumstances. Conduct may have much
more weight than profanity in determining the actual attitude of the parties toward each other. . .
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892, cmt. b.
57. This is frequently seen in athletics. The defendant, the athlete that caused the injury, alleges
that the plaintiff, the injured athlete, consented to the contact that caused the injury. The plaintiff
claims that, while he consented to some otherwise tortious conduct, he did not consent to the conduct
which caused his injury. Thus, the question becomes to what level of conduct has the injured athlete
given his consent? What was acceptable conduct for the defendant to engage in, relying on that con-
sent? See Tavernier v. Maes, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) ("The consent is to the
plaintiffs conduct, rather than to its consequences. If the plaintiff willingly engages in a boxing
match ... he does consent to the defendant's striking at him, and hitting him if he can; and if death
unexpectedly results, his consent to the act will defeat any action for the resulting invasion of his
interests.); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290, 292 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) ("Voluntary participation
in a football game constitutes an implied consent to normal risks attendant to bodily contact permit-
ted by the rules of the sport."); Christo Lassiter, Lex Sportiva: Thoughts Towards a Criminal Law of
Competitive Contact Sport, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 35, 74-78 (2007) (discussing the
defense of implied consent, and its problematic application to sports); see also Jeffrey M. Schalley,
Eliminate Violence from Sports Through Arbitration, Not the Civil Courts, 8 SPORTS LAW. J. 181,
184 (2001) (stating that "[b]oxing is a good example of where the participants consent to conduct
that would normally be considered assault and battery").
58. See, O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891) supra note 41, at 266 (con-
templating both the behavior of the plaintiff and the defendant in dismissing the plaintiffs claim).
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A ("The word 'intent' is used throughout the Res-
tatement[s] . . . to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes
that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.") with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 892(2) ("If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as con-
sent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.").
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perfect, as in the case of the penicillin injection described above. What if it
appears that the plaintiff did not subjectively consent to the defendant's ac-
tions, but acted in a way that caused the defendant to believe that he did?
To properly handle this kind of situation, tort law must abandon the
classic unilateral approach of criminal law that works so well in determining
intent and instead seek analysis analogous to the classic bilateral jurispru-
dence of contract law. The key insight here is that consent to an intentional
tort that is imperfectly communicated by a plaintiff to a defendant is analog-
ous to an offer to enter into a contract that is imperfectly communicated by
an offeror to an offeree. 9 Fundamentally, both involve the regulation of a
communicative act by one party to another regarding the internal state of
mind of the active communicating party.
Just as contract law has come to understand the importance of honoring
and protecting the reasonable expectations of the offeree created by the
communicative acts of the offeror, so too does tort law ultimately protect a
reasonable defendant who is objectively incorrect about the plaintiff's actual
desire to consent to the defendant's otherwise tortious behavior.60 Tort law
protects the defendant's reliance interest in these circumstances by crafting
the test for the existence of the plaintiffs implied consent from the defen-
dant's point of view rather than the plaintiff s.
Thus, the basic test for the existence and scope of the plaintiffs implied
consent in an intentional tort action is whether a reasonable person in the po-
sition of the defendant would have thought the plaintiff had consented to this
specific behavior.6' The focus is placed on the receiver of, and the audience
59. For more than a century, contract law has approached this problem from a perspective that
has come to be known as the objective theory of contracts. From this perspective, the intent of each
contracting party-and their subjective "meeting of the minds"-is largely irrelevant. What matters
are the objective manifestations of intent displayed by the parties to one another. See Hotchkiss v.
National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to
do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties."); Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Ob-
jective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 427 (2000); Samuel
Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L. Q. 365 (1921).
60. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 157 (5th ed. 2003) ("Con-
tract law is permeated by the notion that the law should take into account the reasonable expectations
of contracting parties.").
61. See Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1158 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that "[the defen-
dant] could have proved consent by showing that [the plaintiff] led him reasonably to believe that
she consented to his contact, and that the contact was the same or substantially similar to the contact
to which she consented."); Dubbs v. Head Start,_Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003) ("'If
words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute
apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact."' (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 892(2) (1965))); Ford v. Ford, 10 N.E. 474, 475 (Mass. 1887) ("'[W]ithout the consent' means
without the manifested consent, and that the undisclosed emotions of the deserted party do not affect
his rights."); Curtin v. Curtin, 97 N.Y.S. 771, 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906) ("Of course, her mental
state would naturally aid the conclusion that she did show consent by words or acts, but such mental
state is no substitute for acts or words." (emphasis added)); see also HARPER, supra note 40, at 81
("The consent may be given either by word or conduct of such a character as to lead a reasonable
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for, the plaintiffs communicative act. This reasonable person test allows
that receiver-the defendant-to be reasonably wrong about the actual con-
sent of the plaintiff and yet still benefit from the consent privilege.62 Just as
in contract law, the burden of accurate communication, and thus the risk of
innocent miscommunication, is placed upon the active communicating party.
Here, the active communicating party is the consenting plaintiff. When
properly applied, this test protects the doctor and the nurse in the penicillin
shot scenario from liability to the patient, through the consent privilege, de-
spite the absence of genuine consent on the part of the patient.63
The rationale for a defendant-centered reasonable person test for implied
consent as described above is primarily concerned with the allocation of
burden and risk between two interacting parties-the potentially consenting
plaintiff and the defendant who interprets the plaintiffs behavior and the-
reafter acts in reliance upon that behavior.64 The structure of this problem is
the same as the contract law problem of an inaccurately communicated offer
from an offeror to an offeree." It is what could be called a bilateral analysis,
and it is fundamentally different in nature from the unilateral analysis used
to determine the possession of intent by a defendant or the existence of mens
rea in a criminal prosecution.
person to believe that an assent was expressed. The defendant may rely upon and be guided by the
overt acts and conduct of the plaintiff." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
62. See O'Brien, 28 N.E. at 266 (finding for the defendant-doctor that plaintiff consented to the
vaccination and stating "[t]here was nothing in the conduct of the plaintiff to indicate to the surgeon
that she did not wish ... to be vaccinated .... Viewing his conduct in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, it was lawful.").
63. This has become incorporated into emergency situations where a doctor cannot receive con-
sent from a patient. See Kennedy v. Parrott, 90 S.E.2d 754, 759 (N.C. 1956). In discussing the his-
tory of consent as applied to the medical field, Chief Justice Barnhill notes that during early common
law, surgeries were typically performed in the patient's home and without any form of anesthesia, so
the doctor was able to obtain verbal consent from the patient. Id at 758. However, with advances in
modem medicine, this is no longer the case. Id Affirming the lower court's judgment in favor of
the doctor, Barnhill states that in these cases, "the consent . .. will be construed as general in nature
and the surgeon may extend the operation." Id. at 759; see also HARPER, supra note 40, at 83 ("In
such situations [instances in which the patient is in no position to given consent] .. . the consent is
implied from the circumstances.").
64. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
65. See MELVILLE MADISON BIGELOW, THE LAW OF TORTS 41 (8th ed. 1907). In questioning
the extent to which one's consent extends, Bigelow states, "[t]hat question will, it seems, be of the
same nature as the question of agreement, in the sense of an actual 'union of minds,' in contract."
Id.
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B. Self-Defense
Once this difference between unilateral problems and bilateral problems
in tort law is recognized, the structure of a doctrine or a doctrinal test in a
given area of tort law can often be anticipated. For example, in addition to
consent, the law of intentional torts provides to a defendant in an intentional
tort action a formal privilege of self-defense.66 This means that a defendant
who engages in what would otherwise be an intentional tort will not be held
liable if he can establish that he acted reasonably67 in response to an immi-
nent bodily 6 8 threat posed by the plaintiff.69 Thus, a defendant who reasona-
bly defends himself by roughly blocking a punch thrown by the plaintiff and
forcefully pushing the plaintiff away will not be held liable to the plaintiff
for a battery.70
66. The concept of self-defense as a privilege is a common theme in the Restatement of Torts.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63(1) (1965) ("An actor is privileged to use reasona-
ble force . . . to defend himself against unprivileged harmful or offensive contact or other bodily
harm which he reasonably believes that another is about to inflict intentionally upon him."). The
privilege of self-defense also extends to an actor who reasonably believes he is threatened by negli-
gent conduct of another. See id. § 64(1); see also William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. L.
REV. 650, 655 (1967) (describing that self-defense was a privilege originally conceived in criminal
law and now incorporated into tort law). Richard Epstein suggests that the privilege of self-defense
would be unnecessary if tort law worked flawlessly because each "aggressor would be captured after
inflicting the harm and subjected to a damage award that left him worse off for inflicting the harm
than from never acting at all." Richard A. Epstein, The Tort/Crime Distiction: A Generation Later,
76 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1996). Since the tort system does not capture all aggressors, the tort system
makes the decision to accept a certain degree of risk of unwarranted retaliation against the initial
aggressor rather force the victim to resort only to compensation. Id.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63(1); see also Wilson v. Dimitri, 138 So. 2d 618,
621 (La. Ct. App. 1962) ("The yardstick of the reasonable, prudent man is, generally speaking, the
judicial tool used to measure whether the force used to repel the attack was excessive."); Rollin M.
Perkins, Self-Defense Re-Examined, I UCLA L. REV. 133, 134 (1953) ("The question is not whether
the jury believes the force used was necessary in self-defense, but whether the defendant, acting as a
reasonable man, had this belief.").
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 (indicating that the actor must perceive an imme-
diate infliction of harmful contact in order to invoke the self-defense privilege); see also Goldfuss v.
Davidson, 679 N.E.2d 1099, 1105 (Ohio 1997) (providing that defendant seeking instructions on
self-defense must show a bona fide belief that the alleged danger was imminent); Perkins, supra note
67, at 134 (stating that self-defense requires that the "danger must be, or appear to be, pressing and
urgent. A fear of danger at some future time is not sufficient").
69. When these prerequisites for self-defense are met, an actor has a valid self-defense claim.
See, e.g., Roberson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 912 F.2d 184, 188 (7th Cir. 1990) (providing that a
defendant acting with reasonable force in response to a perceived imminent threat has a complete
defense in a tort action); State v. Bradley, 10 P.3d 358, 360 (Wash. 2000) (finding that a defendant
need not be correct that the threat is imminent as long as the defendant honestly believes the threat is
imminent).
70. The Restatement explains that where an actor is acting in self-defense, his harmful conduct
against the initial aggressor is privileged regardless of whether the actor is motivated by "personal
dislike or hostility to the [initial aggressor]." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63, cmt. e. The
Restatement illustrates this principle by proposing a situation in which actor A plays a "rough prac-
tical joke upon [actor] B" and explaining that B is privileged to use self-defense even though B "has
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What should the basic doctrinal test be for the existence of a self-
defense privilege? The appropriate answer begins with the recognition of
this as an essentially bilateral problem. The paradigmatic set of circums-
tances in which the self-defense privilege is invoked involve the defendant
observing, interpreting, and reacting to the plaintiffs behavior.7  The struc-
ture of the regulatory problem is the same as it is in the case of the implied
consent privilege72 and in the case of an inaccurately communicated offer in
contract law.7n The difference is simply that in the case of self-defense, the
plaintiff is communicating a certain kind of threat to the defendant rather
than communicating consent or an offer to enter into a contract. 74
tolerated similar jokes ... and objects to A's conduct because of personal dislike of A." Id. Com-
mentators have also described that a defender is privileged by self-defense when his harmful conduct
is based on a reasonable but mistaken belief See, e.g., David W. Robertson, The Aggressor Doc-
trine, 1 S.U. L. REv. 82, 84 (1975) (stating that the defendant's use of force "is privileged when his
belief that [the force] is necessary is reasonable but mistaken").
71. Parties commonly dispute over whose actions initiated the aggression and who thereafter
reacted in self-defense. See, e.g., Hanauer v. Coscia, 244 A.2d 611, 613 (Conn. 1968) (indicating
that the plaintiff and defendant provided conflicting accounts of who initiated the aggression after
one parent approached another parent to discuss that his child was being bullied by the other parent's
child); People v. George, 540 N.W.2d 487, 488-89 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) ("Defendant was charged
with felonious assault stemming from an altercation with a co-worker .... It was the prosecution's
theory that the [plaintiff] was merely walking toward defendant to retrieve a tool from his toolbox
when defendant suddenly grabbed a pipe and hit the [plaintiff] without provocation. Defendant con-
tended that the [plaintiff] first shoved him and then walked toward him while swearing and in a me-
nacing manner such that defendant picked up the nearest available object and hit the complainant in
self-defense.").
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D (establishing that an actor shall not be held
liable for unconsented conduct that injures another if "the actor has no reason to believe that the oth-
er, if he had the opportunity to consent, would decline."). In Sullivan v. Montgomery, for example,
the issue of implied consent arose when a father sued a doctor for anaesthetizing his son without the
father's consent. 279 N.Y.S. 575, 576 (N.Y. City Ct. 1935). The court held that the father's consent
was not necessary because implied consent was given when the treatment was administered in an
emergency situation. Id. at 576-77.
73. Inaccurate communication can still lead to formation of a contract under the objective theory
of contract formation. See Perillo, supra note 59, at 427 (2000) ("[Tlhe objective theory of contract
formation and interpretation holds that the intentions of the parties to a contract or alleged contract
are to be ascertained from their words and conduct rather than their unexpressed intentions."). Un-
der the objective theory, the offeror bears the risk of inaccurate communications. See, e.g., Ayer v.
W. Union Tel. Co., 10 A. 495, 497 (Me. 1887) (holding that when an error in the transmission of a
offer occurs, the offeror, as master of the communication and the means of that communication,
must bear the loss for an inaccurately transmitted offer).
74. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 661 A.2d 1037, 1041-42 (Conn. 1995) (holding that a defendant
in a homicide prosecution was entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense when the victim had pre-
viously communicated a verbal threat to defendant's sister and approached defendant aggressively as
defendant was backing away); McMurrey Corp. v. Yawn, 143 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940) (holding that defendant was entitled to a claim of self-defense if at the time defendant shot the
deceased, the action and conduct of the deceased induced defendant to believe that the deceased was
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Having observed this underlying similarity, it should come as little sur-
prise to learn that tort law's basic test for the existence of the self-defense
privilege is whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant
would have believed that the plaintiff posed to him a threat of imminent bo-
dily harm. 5 Again, and for the same reasons as the consent doctrine, the fo-
cus is on the receiving, interpreting party who must act in response to and
rely upon the overt actions of another.16 The test is not whether a reasonable
person in the position of the plaintiff, having acted as the plaintiff did under
the circumstances, would have meant to inflict imminent bodily harm on the
defendant.n Reasonable mistakes by the defendant in interpreting the actual
threat posed to him by the plaintiff are honored, and again, the burden of
such reasonable mistakes is placed on the plaintiff, the party who engaged in
the initial active behavior. This is the consistent doctrinal result of this
kind of bilateral analysis in tort law.
IV. A SECOND KIND OF BILATERAL ANALYSIS
There is present in tort law a second kind of bilateral analysis that im-
portantly distinguishes tort law from the classic unilateral analysis of crimi-
nal law. In criminal law, the fundamental question is whether an unwelcome
about to initiate a deadly attack).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63(1). Conversely, a defendant's unreasonable belief
will preclude him from justifying his actions as self-defense. See, e.g., Smith v. Lauritzen, 356 F.2d
171, 176 (3d Cir. 1966) (requiring defendant to show that at the moment defendant responded he
was acting upon a reasonable fear of harmful bodily contact and finding that "nothing evidences that
[defendant] acted at the moment of the attack with a reasonable fear of bodily harm"); Silas v. Bo-
wen, 277 F. Supp. 314, 318 (D.S.C. 1967) ("[I]n determining whether there was reasonable cause for
the apprehension of serious bodily harm, the difference in age, size, and relative physical strength of
the parties to the controversy is a proper matter for consideration."); Bell v. Smith, 488 S.E.2d 91, 93
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (finding defendant's conduct of firing a gun at a truck that had swerved toward
defendant, but subsequently passed, as not justified under the self-defense privilege).
76. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
77. See Perkins, supra note 67, at 134 (arguing that tort law does not ask whether the self-
defense was necessary under the circumstances, but whether "the defendant, acting as a reasonable
man, had this belief"). As Perkins describes, "One who has knocked down another, in the reasona-
ble belief that this was necessary to prevent being stabbed, is not guilty of battery because it is later
learned that the other intended no harm but was merely playing too realistic a joke with a rubber
dagger." Id.
78. The Restatement states that only one case fails to recognize the privilege of self-defense
when a defendant reasonably, but erroneously believes he is about to be harmed. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 63; see, e.g., Courvoisier v. Raymond, 47 P. 284, 287 (Colo. 1896) (finding
that defendant was entitled to self-defense when he shot a police officer, incorrectly believing that
the officer was one of the attacking rioters); Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 132, 132-33 (Ill. 1873) (deter-
mining that defendant was entitled to self-defense when he struck an innocent bystander, thinking
that the bystander was the person who had assaulted defendant); Landry v. Hill, 94 So. 2d 308, 311
(La. Ct. App. 1957) (providing that self-defense was justified when plaintiff was acting aggressively
and led defendant to believe that plaintiff was about to draw a weapon even though plaintiff claims
he carried no weapon).
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legal remedy, a criminal sanction of some sort, will be imposed upon the de-
fendant. In a sense, the same stakes are at play in any tort action, although
the unwelcome legal remedy is limited to the involuntary confiscation of
some of the defendant's assets and the relatively rare imposition of an in-
junction.so
However, where the imposition of an injunction is not at stake, as in the
great majority of tort actions, the defendant's assets are not merely seized by
the state-as they would in a successful criminal prosecution resulting in a
fine-but are instead transferred to the plaintiff. Thus, as noted earlier, tort
law liability results in both a punishment to the defendant and a reward of
sorts to the plaintiff (in the form of compensation for the harm suffered).
Therefore, tort law, unlike criminal law, must strive to fashion its doctrines
so that liability is created not only in those situations in which it is appropri-
ate to punish the defendant but also appropriate to compensate the plaintiff.
This is a second, and also very significant, kind of bilateral analysis that ex-
ists in tort law. This type of bilateral analysis is not often present in the pre-
dominately unilateral, defendant-centered, punish-or-not analysis of most of
criminal law.
A. Subjective Consent in the Absence of Objective Consent
The need for this second kind of bilateral analysis can considerably
complicate the design of some tort law doctrines. For an example, consider
again the problem of fashioning a proper test for the existence and scope of
implied consent as a privilege to an intentional tort claim. As described
above, the basic test for consent in this context is whether a reasonable per-
son in the position of the defendant would have believed that the plaintiff
was consenting to the defendant's otherwise tortious conduct, given the be-
havior of the plaintiff under the circumstances. 82 As discussed, this test al-
lows a defendant to successfully invoke the consent privilege and thereby
79. See LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 7 ("The substantive criminal law is that law which, for the
purpose of preventing harm to society, declares what conduct is criminal and prescribes the punish-
ment to be imposed for such conduct."); Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law,
88 Nw. U. L. REv. 857 (1994) (identifying the primary functions of criminal law as "rule articula-
tion, liability assignment, and grading").
80. See MILLER, supra note 22, § 21 ("[Civil and criminal] proceedings are distinct, however, and
have a different object, the one being to punish, while the other is to obtain redress for the injury.");
TORCIA, supra note 2, at 7 ("As a result of the criminal prosecution, the offender may be impri-
soned; as a result of the civil action, the injured individual may recover money damages.").
81. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
82. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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avoid liability in some circumstances in which the plaintiff very likely did
not actually consent to the complained-of behavior.
What, however, should be done in circumstances in which the plaintiff
does not effectively communicate consent to the defendant but can neverthe-
less be shown to have actually possessed it? In other words, what if a rea-
sonable person in the position of the defendant observing the plaintiffs be-
havior would not conclude that the plaintiff was consenting to a tortious
invasion of his interest, but the defendant nevertheless engages in the harm
producing behavior and is able, ex post facto, to establish that the plaintiff
did in fact subjectively consent? This is, in a sense, the flip side of the con-
sent problem considered earlier, challenging the law to respond to the ab-
sence of objective consent but the presence of subjective consent.
Suppose, for example, that one friend convinces another to attend a con-
cert by a particular rock band. Knowing that his friend's taste in rock music
is typically more aggressive than the style of this band, he tells his friend
that the lead singer of the band loves to dive off the front of the stage and
fall into the crowd below, and that he can be counted on to do this multiple
times during every concert. Furthermore, he tells his friend that their tickets
will place them in the second row of seats in front of the stage where the
lead singer is very likely to fall. Encouraged and excited by this prospect,
the friend agrees to attend the concert later that night, and they sit in the
second row.
In actuality, the lead singer of the band in question has no reputation for
diving off the stage and no history of having done so. A reasonable person
sitting in front of the stage during the band's performance would not expect
to be touching the band members in any way, and no member of the band
could reasonably expect that the presence of a patron in front of the stage
signaled any sort of consent to being touched by a member of the band.
Nevertheless, on this particular night, the lead singer of the band, for the first
time ever, dives off the stage. The singer lands heavily on the friend seated
in the second row of seats in front of the stage and severely injures him.
The injured friend sues the lead singer for battery. Upon learning during
discovery of the nature of the conversation between the two friends before
the concert, the singer, now the defendant, pleads consent as a complete pri-
vilege. Should the defendant singer avoid liability as a result of the plain-
tiff's subjective consent when the existence of that consent was in no way
communicated to the defendant?
From the perspective of unilateral analysis, this is an easy problem. The
antisocial quality of the defendant's behavior is unchanged by the subse-
quent discovery that the plaintiff possessed subjective consent unbeknownst
to the defendant at the time the harm occurred. So far as the defendant
83. Id.
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knew, the plaintiff was not consenting to this harmful contact and, from the
defendant's perspective, the act of diving onto the plaintiff was socially un-
acceptable and without justification. Thus, the defendant does not deserve
the consent privilege under these circumstances.
Suppose that the patron seated immediately adjacent to the plaintiff was
also struck and injured by the defendant when the defendant dove off the
stage, and no evidence of any sort exists that this second patron subjectively
consented to the contact. In such circumstances, the law of battery would
characterize the defendant's conduct as sufficiently antisocial to justify im-
posing upon him liability for this plaintiffs injuries.84 From the perspective
of the defendant singer at the time the harm producing behavior occurred,
there was no meaningful difference between these two plaintiffs. So far as
the defendant knew, neither of the plaintiffs had impliedly consented to be-
ing touched by the defendant in this manner just by being seated close to the
front of the stage.
Therefore, the defendant is just as deserving of the imposition of liabili-
ty in the first case as he is in the second, and the presence of subjective con-
sent by the plaintiff in the first case should make no difference. Thus, under
a unilateral analysis, the presence of subjective consent by a plaintiff when
the consent is not effectively communicated to the defendant should be irre-
levant to whether the defendant can benefit from the consent privilege.
However, the bilateral nature of the legal remedy in tort law does not
permit the analysis to end here. Though no convincing argument may exist
against imposing liability on the defendant, it could well be argued that the
plaintiff in this situation-the friend who attended the concert in anticipation
of being struck by the lead singer diving from the stage-is not an appropri-
ate beneficiary of the legal remedy, compensation paid by the defendant.
84. Under the Restatement, a person is liable to another for battery "if (a) he acts intending to
cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or
indirectly results." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
85. In criminal law, "[c]onsent of the victim is a defense only when it negates an element of the
offense or precludes infliction of the harm to be prevented by the law defining the of-
fense.... Likewise, the victim's subsequent condonation or ratification of the crime or acceptance
of restitution is not a defense . . . ."). LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 516.
86. See John H. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REv. 17, 72-73
(1961) ("The defendant argues that it is unjust to require him to compensate the plaintiff. After all,
the defendant did not have to act in the first place, and if he had not acted the plaintiff would have
stood no chance of obtaining the advantage he desired. The plaintiff was satisfied enough with the
defendant's conduct when he hoped to gain by it. Only when things have gone badly does he com-
plain that the defendant has violated a duty owing him and demand compensation for the conse-
quences.").
227
The plaintiff experienced no more at the concert than he had expected and
desired. Given this, it would be perverse to allow him to subsequently in-
voke the power of the state to receive an involuntary transfer of assets from
the defendant in the guise of compensation for the experience.
Though clearly appropriate in the context of unilateral analysis, imposi-
tion of liability on the defendant in this kind of case becomes far more prob-
lematic in the context of bilateral analysis. And because tort law, unlike
criminal law, imposes a legal remedy that is both a detriment to the defen-
dant and a benefit to the plaintiff, tort law must operate within the context of
the second kind of bilateral analysis. Thus, courts that have been presented
with the issue have held that the consent privilege is in fact available to a de-
fendant in an intentional tort case if it can be established that the plaintiff
subjectively consented to the defendant's harm-producing behavior, even if
the defendant was not aware of the plaintiff's subjective consent."
B. Self-Defense in Response to an Innocently Generated Threat
The influence of this second kind of bilateral analysis on the design of
tort law doctrine can also be seen in the self-defense privilege. As with all
of the privileges to intentional torts, one motivating factor in the develop-
ment of the self-defense privilege is a desire to keep the privilege as modest
and limited as possible.89 After all, the granting of a formal privilege to en-
87. See id at 75 ("[W]hen as a result of his choice the plaintiff has realized the very ... thing he
considered an advantage, then there is no reason why the machinery of the law should be set in mo-
tion .. . to take money from the defendant and give it to the plaintiff.").
88. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 113 ("Actual willingness, established by competent evi-
dence, will prevent liability; and, if it can ever be proved, will no doubt do so even though the plain-
tiff has done nothing to manifest it to the defendant."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892
cmt. b ("Consent . .. need not, however, be so manifested by words or by affirmative ac-
tion .... Even without a manifestation, consent may be proved by any competent evidence to exist
in fact, and when so proved it is as effective as if manifested."); see also Kenneth W. Simons, As-
sumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REv.
213, 248 (1987) ("Consent is the right term to use when the plaintiff was willing that a certain event
occur ... because he desired an invasion of a normally protected interest." (citing Mansfield, supra
note 86, at 31-32)). Simons, in comparing the doctrine of consent in intentional torts to assumption
of the risk in non-intentional torts, states that "[c]onsent should imply relative certainty that the risk
will materialize." Id.
89. Punitive damages may be seen as a way to discourage self-defense. See Charles Calleros,
Punitive Damages, Liquidated Damages, and Clauses Penales in Contract Actions: A Comparative
Analysis of the American Common Law and the French Civil Code, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 67, 79
(2006) ("Punitive damages... supplement compensatory damages as a means of substituting for,
and thus discouraging, violent or otherwise antisocial self-help remedies."). One of the principal
limitations is the use of deadly force. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65 (providing that
an actor may only use deadly force in response to the threat of deadly force or serious bodily harm).
Commentators have also explained that self-defense in response to non-deadly force is limited to the
extent that three preconditions are satisfied:
The first is that he reasonably believes the other intends to commit a battery upon him, or
unlawfully to imprison him, and this belief has been induced by the other's conduct. The
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gage in what would otherwise be an intentional tort means that harm can be
intentionally inflicted upon another without the fear of being forced, through
a subsequent tort action, to involuntarily compensate the victim.90 In a
sense, intentional tort law pays for its formal privileges in the currency of
undeterred harm and uncompensated injury.9' While there are good and suf-
ficient reasons for the existence of privileges-like consent, self-defense,
defense of others, and necessity-to an intentional tort, the larger goals of
deterring harmful behavior and compensating injury are best served when
these reasons are satisfied as narrowly as possible.
In self-defense, as noted earlier, the basic test for the availability of the
privilege is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would
have believed that the plaintiff posed to him a threat of imminent harmful
bodily contact.92 From the defendant's perspective, this privilege permits
the defendant to engage in immediate self-help against the threat without
fear of subsequent liability, so long as the defendant's response, though in-
tentionally harm-producing, was reasonable under the circumstances.93
second is that the defensive force used is not unreasonable in view of the harm which it is
intended to prevent. And the third is that the defender reasonably believes he cannot
avoid the threatened harm without either using defensive force or giving up some right or
privilege.
Perkins, supra note 67, at 135. Additionally, self-defense is not available when the harmful
conduct is used as retaliation or revenge. See Robertson, supra note 70, at 84 ("[T]he privilege
of self-defense is based on the prevention of harm to the actor, not on the desire to extract
payment for it, no matter how understandable that desire.").
90. See Epstein, supra note 66, at 14. Epstein indicates that the privilege of self-defense is es-
sentially a recognition that society would rather accept some amount of undue aggression permitted
by self-defense rather than leave the potential victim only the option of later recovery. Id.
91. Id. In Paxton v. Boyer, for example, an innocent bystander went uncompensated for injuries
suffered when defendant reasonably but incorrectly believed that the bystander was the aggressor.
67 Ill. 132 (1873). Similarly, in Crabtree v. Dawson, the court reversed a judgment for a plaintiff
who was struck by defendant with the butt of a musket and pushed down a flight of stairs because
the court found defendant had a reasonable but incorrect belief that plaintiff was a third party who
defendant had previously quarreled with. 83 S.W. 557 (Ky. 1904).
92. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
93. Self-help is essentially an extra-judicial means of addressing a wrong. See Jason M. Solo-
mon, Judging Plaintiffs, 60 VAND. L. REv. 1749, 1788 (2007) ("When we think of self-help in the
law, we generally think about means of self-help that the law authorizes or condones. For example,
an act of violence that might normally be a battery in tort, and aggravated assault in crime, might be
considered lawful as self-defense depending on the circumstances."). Solomon goes so far as to ar-
gue that where self-help is available, a plaintiff should be precluded from having a cause of action.
Id. at 1793-94. Another formulation of self-help provides that self-help is "legally permissible con-
duct that individuals undertake absent the compulsion of law and without the assistance of a gov-
ernment official in efforts to prevent or remedy a legal wrong." Douglas Ivor Brandon, et al., Self-
Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND.
L. REv. 845, 853 (1984). Early medieval formulations of tort law provided self-help against a tort-
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Apart from supporting the basic value of self-help under such circumstances,
it could be argued that the existence of the privilege may often result in less
total harm than would occur in the absence of a self-defense privilege.94
From the perspective of the plaintiff, the self-defense privilege, when
available to the defendant, will result in the plaintiff being intentionally in-
jured by the defendant without the prospect of receiving forced compensa-
tion from the defendant for that harm.95 In cases in which the plaintiff acted
intending to imminently strike the defendant or to at least cause the defen-
dant to think so, the withdrawal of a subsequent opportunity to receive
forced compensation for the defendant's harm-producing response to that
imminent threat-the privilege of self-defense-is justifiable based on the
antisocial nature of posing such a threat to another.96 In a sense, so long as
the defendant's self-defense response is reasonable, the plaintiff suffers no
more than he deserves in the way of uncompensated harm, given that he in-
tentionally threatened another. Thus, the existence of such a self-defense
privilege under these circumstances can be said to be appropriate under both
a unilateral and a bilateral analysis.
The same conclusion holds in cases where the plaintiff does not inten-
tionally pose a threat to the defendant, but does so negligently. For example,
the plaintiff has just finished a meal in a restaurant, during which he ingested
too many alcoholic beverages. He stands from his seat to leave the restau-
rant and is light-headed and disoriented. On his way to the door, he trips
over a service cart and lurches at a fairly high speed toward another patron
seated at a nearby table. The other patron sees the plaintiff coming and
pushes him away at the last moment, causing the plaintiff to fall heavily onto
the floor and severely injure his shoulder.
feasor as the exclusive remedy because plaintiffs often lacked access to courts or the courts were too
limited in jurisdiction. Id. at 852 (citing J. JEUDWINE, TORT, CRIME, AND POLICE IN MEDIEVAL
BRITAIN 24-25 (1917)).
94. See Brandon, supra note 93, at 855 (arguing that self-defense is a way to fight "fire with fire"
and "often is the most effective method of minimizing the total personal and societal harm that is
possible").
95. See id. ("In tort law this [self-defense] privilege shields the defending person from liability
for acts that ordinarily would result in liability.").
96. Examples of an aggressor bringing suit against a self-defender are rare. See Brandon, supra
note 84, at 855 ("Tort actions by an instigator against his intended victim, however, are relatively
rare."). The justification for self-defense is not that the initial aggressor deserves to be harmed, but
that the self-defender is justified under the circumstances. See People v. Minifie, 920 P.2d 1337,
1344 (Cal. 1996) ("[T]he law recognizes the justification of self-defense not because the victim 'de-
served' what he or she got, but because the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances.
Reasonableness is judged by how the situation appeared to the defendant, not the victim.").
97. In criminal law, "one who is not the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using a reasona-
ble amount of force against his adversary when he reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate
danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and (b) that the use of such force is necessary to
avoid this danger." LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 491; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Use of Force in
Self-Protection).
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So long as pushing the plaintiff away in that fashion was part of a rea-
sonable effort to avoid the impending collision," the other patron should not
be liable to the plaintiff for a battery due to the availability of the self-
defense privilege, despite the fact that he clearly intentionally pushed away
the plaintiff.99 As in the case of an intentionally posed threat, this result can
be justified from the plaintiff s perspective inasmuch as the plaintiff was at
fault in creating the threat to the defendant. As between the at-fault plaintiff
and the innocent and reasonable defendant, it should be the plaintiff who ab-
sorbs the cost of his injury.'00 Thus, the existence of a self-defense privilege
in the case of a negligently, as well as an intentionally, generated threat can
be said to make sense under both a unilateral and a bilateral analysis.'0'
The problematic class of cases, of course, are the ones in which the
plaintiff does in fact pose a threat of imminent bodily harm to the defendant,
but does so innocently.102 For example, in the restaurant setting above, sup-
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 cmt. c ("[T]he important fact in determining
whether the employment of a particular means of self-defense is privileged ... is the harm which the
actor intends to inflict, or which a reasonable man in his position would realize that it is likely to
cause, and not that which it actually causes.").
99. It is immaterial that the self-defender intends harm or thinks that his actions may be likely to
cause harm to the negligent actor. See id.
100. Therefore, a plaintiff is excluded from recovery because of his own wrongdoing. See Ronen
Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A Descriptive Theory, 73 TENN.
L. REV. 177, 211-12 (2006) ("In recent decades, courts employed ex turpi causa to exclude recovery
by plaintiffs whose conduct was perceived to be extremely grievous. For example, in Barker v. Kal-
lash a teenager was injured when a pipe-bomb that he was constructing using material supplied by
the defendants exploded. The Court of Appeals of New York reasoned that, when the plaintiffs in-
jury is a direct result of his knowing and intentional participation in a criminal act, he cannot seek
compensation for the loss when the criminal act is judged to be so serious an offense as to warrant
denial of recovery." (footnotes omitted)).
101. Contract law is consistent with this approach inasmuch as the acts of the contracting parties
manifesting their assent must be either intentionally or negligently done. See Clarke B. Whittier,
The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CAL. L. REV. 441, 447-48 (1929).
102. Some commentators argue that the test for situations where an innocent actor is harmed by a
party reasonably acting in his own interest should depend on whether the harm caused to the inno-
cent actor "violated social expectations." See Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Vi-
sions Of A Restatement (Fourth) Of Torts, 50 UCLA L. REv. 585, 609 (2002) (providing the exam-
ple of a bank security guard mistakenly shooting an innocent bystander). Sugarman proposes two
possible outcomes:
[P]erhaps it could be argued that victims of the conduct of the bank guards and the securi-
ty guards cannot really imagine they might be accidentally singled out for the injury they
suffer. So, when such mistakes occur, our violated social expectations demand victim
compensation. On the other hand, we might decide instead that these experiences are no
more than bad luck to which no special expectations attach. If so, they are rightly unders-
tood simply as instances of the much wider default category of not-reasonably-avoidable
accidents, the financial consequences of which fall on victims, not injurers.
Id. (emphasis added).
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pose that the plaintiff has ingested no alcohol during the meal and he is
completely clear headed as he stands to leave. Rather than tripping, the
plaintiff is struck hard from behind by a service cart and as a result lurches at
high speed toward the patron at the other table. Again, the other patron sees
the plaintiff coming and pushes him away at the last moment, causing him to
hit the floor and seriously injure his shoulder.
If the self-defense privilege is made available to the other patron-the
defendant in a subsequent battery action-the plaintiff will not be able to re-
ceive compensation from him and the plaintiff will be left to absorb the costs
of his own severely injured shoulder. 0 3 This despite the fact that it was the
defendant who intentionally inflicted the harmful bodily contact upon the
plaintiff without any plausible argument that the plaintiff was complicit in
having created the threat that he posed to the defendant. In contrast to the
cases of an intentionally or negligently created threat, the plaintiff in this
class of cases in no way deserves the withdrawal of the opportunity to re-
ceive forced compensation occasioned by the operation of the self-defense
privilege.'0 Being on the receiving end of the defendant's privileged inflic-
tion of bodily harm cannot in this case be characterized as the plaintiff s just
desert.
On the other hand, from the defendant's perspective, a genuine but in-
nocently created threat by the plaintiff is often indistinguishable from an in-
tentionally or a negligently generated threat. In all of these situations, the
defendant reasonably believes that the plaintiff poses a threat of imminent
harmful bodily contact. Given the requirement of imminence, it is unrealis-
tic to expect that most defendants facing such a situation would be able to
ascertain whether the threat posed by the plaintiff was intentionally, negli-
gently or innocently generated and to distinguish the former two from the
latter.
103. Cf Solomon, supra note 93, at 1787-88 (providing that self-defense permits a defendant to
carry out an act of violence that would otherwise be considered battery).
104. This result contrasts with the well-known case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. in
which the court held the defendant liable to the plaintiff for damages caused when the defendant
docked his boat to the plaintiffs dock during a powerful storm. 124 N.W. 221, 221-22 (Minn.
1910). Some commentators have argued that it is not clear why the plaintiff in Vincent is permitted
to recover while tort law refuses to compensate other plaintiffs, such as innocent bystanders in a
bank robbery mistakenly shot by the security guard:
Just why the innocent dock owner can recover, but the innocent yet suspected shoplifter
and the innocent victim of the bank guard's bullets cannot, is something of a mystery to
me. Clearly, in each of these cases, the defendants acted reasonably in self-defense of
person or property, and each of the defendants, in furtherance of his own interests, im-
posed a loss on an innocent party. And it is even more troubling to me that the successful
plaintiff in Vincent is a commercial actor, whereas the losing plaintiffs in the other ex-
amples are ordinary citizens. Perhaps there are different social expectations that attach to
the private necessity situation.
Sugarman, supra note 102, at 610.
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Moreover, even if the defendant could somehow determine that the im-
minent threat to his person posed by the plaintiff was generated innocently
and not intentionally or negligently, why should the law alter its basic
scheme of behavioral incentives? Does the defendant have less of a right to
engage in self-help against a threat posed to his physical safety if that threat
is innocent? Why should the defendant be expected to react any differently
in response to the rapidly approaching plaintiff, whether the plaintiff was
sent lurching in his direction as a result of being struck by a service cart,
tripping over the service cart, or maliciously lunging at him? In all of these
situations, so long as the defendant reasonably perceives the threat and rea-
sonably responds to it, the defendant can be said to have acted in a socially
acceptable manner that should not trigger tort liability.
The difficult nature of bilateral analysis in tort law is illustrated here, in
the problem of appropriately fashioning the privilege of self-defense in re-
sponse to an innocently generated threat. In such situations, it is not justifi-
able to withdraw the purely innocent plaintiffs opportunity to receive com-
pensation for an intentionally inflicted physical injury. Nothing that the
plaintiff did warrants this dramatic change in the likely outcome of his bat-
tery claim. On the other hand, it is also not justifiable in such situations to
withhold from the defendant the formal privilege of self-defense. All of the
reasons for providing to the defendant the privilege in the cases of intention-
al and negligent threats, at least from his perspective, apply with equal force
to the case of an innocently generated threat.os
V. BILATERAL ANALYSIS AND THE PRESENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY IN
INTENTIONAL TORT LAW
Tort law does not have the luxury enjoyed by criminal law and by many
administrative schemes of regulation that are also based primarily upon un-
ilateral analysis to respond to difficult issues by deciding that, in the face of
insufficient justification, no formal legal action should be taken. 06 Where
105. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 1-3 (2d ed. 1969). Perkins describes how,
upon arrest for any particular criminal offense, there is still a great likelihood that a trial and subse-
quent conviction will never take place. Id. at 1-2. He gives the example of a poor orphan who, after
spending days looking for work, and having had very little to eat, steals half a loaf of bread from an
open window. Id at 2. As a result, he is arrested for burglary, a felony with no opportunity for pro-
bation as punishment. Id. at 3. However, the prosecuting attorney realizes that sending the orphan
to the penitentiary would be a "gross injustice" and lowers the charge to larceny, a felony with the
possibility of probation as punishment. Id. Perkins notes that "[n]othing in the code of criminal
procedure of that state mentions any such step as [lowering the charge]. It is merely one of the mul-
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criminal law can conclude that no sanction should be imposed upon a defen-
dant in the face of reasonable doubt about the antisocial quality of the defen-
dant's behavior, tort law operates much differently. In tort law, the choice to
impose a detriment upon the defendant almost always results in the confer-
ring of a benefit upon the plaintiff, and a decision to forego imposing a legal
remedy on the defendant results in the withdrawal of an opportunity for the
plaintiff to receive compensation for harm he already experienced. In this
respect, tort law is very similar to contract law. Generally, when dealing
with problems involving bilateral analysis, giving the benefit of the doubt to
one party usually means burdening the other party with that same benefit of
the doubt.
The discussion in Part IV.B. above illustrates this feature of bilateral
analysis in tort law in the context of the privilege of self-defense.'(o Where
the threat posed to the defendant by the plaintiff is genuine but innocently
generated, neither party has acted in a blameworthy manner that justifies
their losing the subsequent intentional tort action.'0 The plaintiff has expe-
rienced intentional bodily harm at the hands of the defendant and has done
nothing to justify the withdrawal of his opportunity to receive compensation
through the operation of the self-defense privilege. Similarly, the defendant
reacted to an imminent threat in a reasonable manner and did nothing to war-
rant the imposition of intentional tort liability. Again, one might say that in
the face of an insufficient justification, tort law should choose not to formal-
ly act and abstain from imposing liability. However, such a principle neces-
sarily chooses between the competing sides of the argument and is therefore
not neutral.
In fact, tort law does not regularly respond to difficult bilateral problems
of this sort by choosing not to impose liability, even in the area of intention-
al torts. Intentional tort law will sometimes react to this kind of bilateral
problem by instead imposing liability on the relatively blameless defen-
dant.'
A. Self-Defense in Response to a Third-Party Threat
An example of this approach can be found within the self-defense privi-
lege itself. Suppose that the defendant is a patron in a bank alongside other
patrons when armed gunmen enter and attempt to rob the bank. One of the
gunmen points a loaded weapon at the defendant, throws him a coil of rope,
titude of administrative devices which play a leading role in the actual administration of criminal
justice." Id.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 89-105.
108. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 110-21 (discussing the privileges of self-defense in re-
sponse to a third-party threat and private necessity and their impact on liability in intentional torts).
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and demands that he tightly bind and gag some other patrons, including the
plaintiff. The defendant complies with the gunman's request. Subsequently,
the plaintiff brings a claim against the defendant for battery.
In this situation, the defendant is reasonable in perceiving an imminent
threat of bodily harmno and is also reasonable in deciding to bind and gag
the plaintiff rather than risk being shot and killed by the gunman. The basic
requirements of the self-defense privilege are clearly satisfied."' The gener-
al issue raised for intentional tort law, in this case, is the extent to which the
privilege of self-defense should be available to the defendant when the threat
to which the defendant is responding comes from someone other than the
plaintiff. It is relatively well-settled that in such a circumstance the defen-
dant is liable to the plaintiff for all but very minor violations of the plain-
tiff's bodily interests." 2 Thus, in this bank robbery scenario, the defendant
would be liable to the plaintiff for the battery of binding and gagging him.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 cmt. k (1965) (clarifying that a self-defense privi-
lege exists only if one reasonably believes that bodily harm can be prevented by immediate infliction
of harm upon another, meaning that one is faced with the threat of immediate attack); Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 223
(2004) ("A threat is imminent if it will occur 'immediately' or 'at once."').
11l. Touchet v. Hampton, 2006-1120, p. 5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/7/07); 950 So. 2d 895, 899 ("[A]
defendant's actions can be justified as self-defense if there was an actual or reasonably apparent
threat to his safety and the force employed was not excessive in degree or kind."); Martin v. Estrella,
266 A.2d 41, 46 (R.I. 1970) ("[A] person who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of
harm at the hands of another may defend himself. He does not have to wait for the first blow to
land."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63. Pursuant to the self-defense privilege, one may
"use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to defend himself
against unprivileged harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm which he reasonably believes
that another is about to inflict intentionally upon him." Id.; Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Dis-
tinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 191, 205 n.39 (1998). One may use force in self-defense to oppose the force of an adversary
if the adversary's force is unlawful or if one reasonably believes that it is unlawful, meaning that the
adversary's use of force is a crime or tort. Id
112. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 129. While "[i]t may be that there is no liability in such a
case for the mere technical tort,. . . it seems reasonable to say that the privilege is qualified, and that
[the defendant] should be required to pay for it by making compensation for any actual damage."
Id; see Francis H. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Prop-
erty and Personality, 39 HARv. L. REV. 307, 316 (1925) ("Society has an interest in saving human
life and property from destruction, but its only concern with the cost of salvage is that it shall be put
upon him who, as between individuals concerned, should bear it.... [I]t is obviously just that he
whose interests are advanced by the act should bear the cost of doing it rather than that he should be
permitted to impose it upon one who derives no benefit from the act."); Julia A. Harden, Dramshop
Liability: Should the Intoxicated Person Recover for His Own Injuries, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 227, 243
(1987). One basis for holding the defendant liable in such a situation is the least cost avoider theory,
which states that the party who can prevent a harmful situation at the least cost to society should bear
liability if the situation occurs. Id. The reason for holding the least cost avoider liable is that it will
encourage that person to avoid the harmful situation in the first place. Id.; see also Jackson v. PKM
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B. The Private Necessity Privilege
Another instance where intentional tort law imposes liability on the de-
fendant in the face of a difficult, conflicted bilateral analysis is illustrated by
the facts of the famous case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.. "3
In that case, the defendant, the owner of a ship, responded to reports of an
impending storm by having the ship lashed tightly against the plaintiffs
dock.1 4  When the storm arrived, the defendant's ship was repeatedly
thrown against the dock, causing significant damage.' The owner of the
dock subsequently sued the owner of the ship for the damage done, claiming
that the harm to the dock was substantially certain to occur given the oncom-
ing storm and the defendant's decision to secure the ship to the dock"l6 and
that a trespass to chattels had therefore taken place. 17
The court held that the owner of the ship was liable to the dock owner
for damage caused.' This case illustrates the intentional tort privilege of
private necessity."1 This privilege is available to a defendant who reasona-
Corp., 422 N.W.2d 657, 665 (Mich. 1988) (Archer, J., concurring in part) (adopting the least cost
avoider theory).
113. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910); see George C. Christie, The
Unwarranted Conclusions Drawn from Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. Concerning the
Defense of Necessity, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
and the Doctrine of Necessity, art. 7, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss7/ art7("Few cases have captured more attention from philosophers interested in the law than Vincent v.
Lake Erie Transportation Co ..... [T]he case has become the starting point for nearly all scholarly
discussions of the propriety of taking or destroying the property of others to save life . . . ." (footnote
omitted)).
114. Vincent, 124 N.W. at 221.
115. Id.
116. See id.; Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REv. 1147, 1166 n.54
(2006).
117. See Prentzel v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 169 P.3d 573, 583 (Alaska 2007) ("Trespass to
chattels is a lesser form of conversion: it 'can be committed when a party intentionally dispossesses
another of the chattel or intentionally uses or interferes with a chattel in another's possession."'
(quoting K&K Recycling, Inc. v. Alaska Gold Co., 80 P.3d 702, 717 n.26 (Alaska 2003))); Intel
Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 302 (Cal. 2003) (explaining that trespass to chattels allows recovery
for a defendant's interference with another's possession of personal property that has "caused some
injury to the chattel or to the plaintiffs rights in it"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(b)
(1965) ("A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally ... using or intermeddling with a
chattel in the possession of another."); id. at § 218(b) ("One who commits a trespass to a chattel is
subject to liability to the possessor of the chattel if, but only if, . . . the chattel is impaired as to its
condition, quality, or value. . . ."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 85 (explaining that a trespass to
chattels includes damaging or destroying the goods of another); Dr. Georgios I. Zekos, State Cyber-
space Jurisdiction and Personal Cyberspace Jurisdiction, 15 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 1, 11 (2007).
The basic requirements to prove trespass to chattels are interference or meddling with a chattel, caus-
ing damage to the chattel. Id.
118. Vincent, 124 N.W. at 222.
119. An extended description of the factual background of the Vincent case can be found in Ste-
phen D. Sugarman, The "Necessity" Defense and the Failure of Tort Theory: The Case Against
Strict Liability for Damages Caused While Exercising Self-Help in an Emergency, in ISSUES IN
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bly perceives an imminent threat to himself or to his property and who then
reacts to that threat reasonably and in a way that intentionally violates
another's property interests.120  The good news for the defendant is that the
formal privilege of private necessity is available to him in such circums-
tances. The bad news is that it is a limited privilege that requires the defen-
dant to compensate the plaintiff for the harm that the defendant causes to the
plaintiff s property.12 '
C The Case for Strict Liability
Both the limited privilege of private necessity and the self-defense privi-
lege in response to a third-party threat present very similar and very difficult
problems of bilateral analysis in tort law. Much of tort law, and almost all
of the traditional doctrines such as the intentional torts, are considered fun-
damentally fault-based, requiring some undesirable or antisocial act by a
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. and the Doctrine of Necessity, Ar-
ticle 1, at 7-10 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss7/artl.
120. Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, 585 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (D. Or.
1984) aff'd, 767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining private necessity as a defense that allows a
defendant to reasonably interfere with the property of another in order to protect person or property);
Guzman v. Barth, 552 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Neb. 1996) (explaining that according to the doctrine of
private necessity, "one is privileged to enter on the land of another if the entry is necessary to pre-
vent serious harm to the actor, [or] his or her land or chattels"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 197(1)(a) ("One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession of another if it is or rea-
sonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to ... the actor, or his land or chat-
tels .... ); id § 263(1) ("One is privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a trespass to
the chattel of another or a conversion of it, if it is or is reasonably believed to be reasonable and ne-
cessary to protect the person or property of the actor ... from serious harm . . . ."); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 145-48. If one faces an emergency that is sufficiently great, then "he may trespass
upon the property of another to save himself or his own property ... from harm." Id. at 147 (foot-
notes omitted); Calnan, supra note 30, at 712-13 ("Private necessity allows a party in imminent
danger of losing her own property to appropriate, use or destroy the property of someone else, even
if the owner contests the taking... . In each case, the persons subject to these privileges cannot res-
ist the intrusion." (footnote omitted)).
121. Vincent, 124 N.W. at 222 (holding that where defendants reasonably take advantage of the
property of plaintiffs for the purpose of protecting their own property, then the plaintiffs are entitled
to compensation for any injury done to their property); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197(2)
("Where the entry is for the benefit of the actor ... he is subject to liability for any harm done in the
exercise of the privilege ... to any legally protected interest of the possessor in the land or connected
with it . . . ."); id § 263(2) ("Where the act is for the benefit of the actor . .. he is subject to liability
for any harm caused by the exercise of the privilege."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 147-48.
The private necessity defense is an incomplete and partial privilege which does not apply to substan-
tial harm inflicted upon the plaintiff by the defendant. Id; Bernard W. Bell, The Wide World of
Torts: Reviewing Franklin & Rabin's Tort Law and Alternatives, 25 SEATILE U. L. REV. 1, 42 n. 187
(2001) (explaining that under the defense of private necessity, "the actor must nevertheless compen-
sate the property owner for his intrusion").
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party in order to justify imposing liability upon them.122  Notwithstanding
this perception, both private necessity and self-defense from third-party
threats confront tort law with defendants who have not acted in an undesira-
ble manner, yet tort law nonetheless holds them liable.123
In the case of the bank robbery, neither the defendant nor society would
prefer that the defendant choose death by the gunman instead of binding and
gagging the plaintiff-a much less severe harm. Similarly, both the defen-
dant and society would prefer that damage be intentionally caused to the
dock by lashing the ship to it if the likely alternative would be much greater
harm inflicted upon the undocked ship during the storm. Why, then, has tort
law created liability for the defendants in both situations and, as a result,
generated a deterrence for them to act in the preferred manner?
Explanations of the results in these cases may begin with the recognition
that both cases present classically difficult problems of bilateral analysis in
tort law. That is to say that neither the defendants nor the plaintiffs in these
cases acted in an antisocial or blameworthy manner that could serve as a jus-
tification for them losing the lawsuit. Thus, the question becomes less a
matter of arguing why the defendant or the plaintiff, in isolation, should win
or lose, but instead becomes a matter of determining who, as between the
plaintiff and the defendant, should pick up the costs for the harm or damage
caused. One must remain mindful that this harm has already occurred and
that one or the other of the parties will inevitably pay for that harm.
From the perspective of bilateral analysis, a number of arguments on
behalf of the plaintiff can be identified. One argument is that a rule that held
the defendants were not liable in both of these situations would, in effect,
allow the defendants, by their conscious choice and voluntary act, to transfer
some of the costs of responding to an external threat from themselves to the
plaintiffs.124 Though it may not have been of their own making or due to
their own fault, fate placed both of these defendants in the path of significant
122. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 2 ("[Tlorts are traditionally associated with wrongdoing in some
moral sense. In the great majority of cases today, tort liability is grounded in the conclusion that the
wrongdoer was at fault in a legally recognizable way. It is not ordinarily enough to impose liability
that the defendant has merely caused harm by accident or happenstance; he must also be at fault.").
123. See Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 2 ("[T]he doctrine [of private necessity] has foundational im-
portance because it involves liability without fault: the self-help actor can reasonably use another's
property and still incur liability for the property damage.").
124. See Gregory C. Keating, Property Right and Tortious Wrong in Vincent v. Lake Erie, in
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. and the Doctrine of Neces-
sity, art. 6, at 2 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss7/art6 ("Vincent v. Lake Erie fas-
cinates in part because it involves just this surprise: Reasonable, justified, conduct forms the basis of
liability. Because the conduct is both intentional and reasonable the liability in Vincent is, paradoxi-
cally, both intentional and strict. Liability is predicated not on criticism of the defendant's con-
duct-lashing the ship to the dock is regarded as the right and reasonable thing to do-but on criti-
cism of the defendant's failure to make reparation for the harm that its reasonable conduct
deliberately inflicted.").
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danger, one from the human agency of the gunman inside the bank and the
latter from the impending storm.125 Though it may have been reasonable and
even socially desirable for the defendants in each of these cases to inflict
harm upon the plaintiffs in their efforts to escape from danger, it is another
thing altogether to say that the unwilling plaintiffs should also absorb the
costs of these reasonable escape efforts. Why should the consumption of re-
sources by the defendants in their efforts to respond to the danger that they
faced be involuntarily subsidized by the plaintiffs, especially when these
plaintiffs were in no way responsible for the creation of that peril?
In addition, the plaintiffs could argue that a rule that did not hold the de-
fendants in these cases liable would create a less desirable set of behavioral
incentives for those persons who in the future found themselves in a similar
position to that of the defendants than would a rule that held the defendants
liable.126 This argument begins with the assertion that society's primary in-
terest in these situations is that the danger faced by the defendant be re-
sponded to at the least total cost. In other words, society should be relatively
indifferent as to whether it is the defendant or the plaintiff who experiences
the battery in the bank, or whether it is the ship or the dock that suffers dam-
age in the storm, and should instead be concerned that the total damage in-
flicted during the incident be minimized.'27
Having established this benchmark, the plaintiffs could go on to argue
that a rule that provided a defendant with a complete privilege, available as
long as the defendant reasonably perceived the imminent threat and reasona-
bly responded to it, would frequently allow for excessive harm to be in-
flicted by the defendant on the plaintiffs person or property. Excessive
harm in this context would mean more harm than is objectively necessary in
order for the defendant to avoid or minimize the threat. Operating under
such a complete privilege, defendants facing a threat would be tempted to
violate the plaintiffs legal interests aggressively in an attempt to absolutely
minimize the possibility of harm to themselves or their property. While the
scope of the complete privilege offered to the defendants would still be
bounded by reasonableness, finders of fact operating ex post facto would
have a difficult time calibrating and second guessing the judgments of a de-
fendant operating under the pressure of a significant imminent threat.
125. See supra text accompanying notes I10-12, 113-17.
126. See CLARENCE MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 39-42 (2d ed. 1980) (1953).
127. See Dale W. Broeder, Torts and Just Compensation: Some Personal Reflections, 17
HASTINGs L. J. 217, 228 (1965); Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 9 ("In a regime of strict liability ... [t]he
duty-holder's desire to minimize her costs-the cost of precaution and injury compensation-leads
her to choose precautions that satisfy the cost-benefit test.").
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For example, suppose that the defendant in the bank robbery scenario
responded to the gunman's demand to bind and gag some of the other pa-
trons by engaging in the task with exceptional vigor, binding the other pa-
trons very tightly in an effort to impress the gunman with his compliance
and to thereby minimize the risk of being shot.128 As the result of these very
tight bindings, some of those tied up by the defendant suffer more severe in-
juries than they otherwise would. While it may have been true under the cir-
cumstances that the defendant did not need to bind the patrons so tightly in
order satisfy the gunman, this would be a very tough judgment for a jury to
make in a subsequent action for battery when applying a reasonableness
standard to the scope of a complete self-defense privilege. One would in-
stead expect most finders of fact to be quite sympathetic to the plight of the
defendant and to find that the scope of a complete privilege was exceeded in
only the most extreme circumstances.
Thus under a complete privilege, one would expect, over time, signifi-
cant harm to be imposed upon the interests of the plaintiffs by threatened de-
fendants seeking to minimize their exposure to the imminent threat. The
doctrine itself would provide little effective deterrence to the infliction by
these defendants of excessive harm.
This observation leads to a third possible argument. Plaintiffs could ar-
gue that a doctrine of limited privilege in these circumstances, which would
hold the defendant liable for all of the meaningful harm that the defendant
intentionally inflicted upon the plaintiff, regardless of the reasonableness of
the defendant's reaction to an imminent threat, would both create the proper
set of behavioral incentives and also impose those incentives on the appro-
priate decision-maker and actor in such circumstances.12 9 In doing so, impo-
sition of liability on the defendant would distinguish itself as the more at-
tractive legal doctrine.
In the class of cases under consideration, involving a defendant who is
facing an imminent threat of harm and who responds to that threat by inten-
tionally harming the person or property of the plaintiff, it is the defendant
who is the fulcrum of judgment and action. It is the defendant who must
evaluate the nature and seriousness of the threat, identify and consider poss-
ible responses and then ultimately act in one way or another. Thus, any le-
gal rule that attempts to minimize the total harm arising from such situations
must make as its primary audience the defendant. Incentives and deterrents
aimed at other actors, such as the plaintiff, are merely secondary.
By holding the defendant liable for all of the significant harm that he in-
tentionally causes to others in these situations, a rule of limited privilege
would focus all of the stakes on the defendant. If the defendant chooses to
128. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
129. See GUIDO CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 162-69 (1970).
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minimize the harm that he inflicts upon others, thereby increasing the risk
that he faces from the threat, and that risk ripens into injury, then the defen-
dant will absorb the cost. Conversely, if the defendant chooses to increase
the harm that he inflicts upon others in an effort to minimize his own risk of
harm, then he will pay for that cost as well. Under a rule of limited privi-
lege, most of the costs stemming from the defendant's response to the threat
are in fact borne by him.
Thus, under a rule of limited privilege, the owner of the ship in the case
of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. can expect to absorb the harm to
the ship caused by the storm if he chooses not to lash to the dock and instead
takes his chances on the water, and he can expect to pay for the damage
done to the dock by the ship if he chooses to secure it to the dock.130 In such
circumstances, the owner of the ship, the person in the best position to eva-
luate the relative cost of various responses to the threat and who in the end
must act, is encouraged to identify and pursue the least costly response to the
imminent threat.
By adopting a rule of limited privilege, society has aligned the self-
interest of the primary decision-maker and actor with its own larger inter-
ests. 1' In this way, over time, one can expect less harm to be inflicted and
incurred in these situations than would be the case under a rule of complete
privilege.
Finally, plaintiffs could argue that it is the defendant who is usually in
the superior position to recover the costs of his escape from the threat when
the cause of the threat is a viable source of recovery. In many cases, of
course, the cause of the threat to the defendant will not be a viable source of
recovery, as in both the bank robbery situation (since the gunman is not like-
ly to be responsive to judgment)132 and in situations similar to Vincent v.
Lake Erie Transportation Co. (where the source of the threat to the defen-
dant was a storm).' This is why resolution of the tort action between the
plaintiff and the defendant is important.
In those cases where the source of the threat is a person who might be
recovered from, the plaintiff could argue that as between defendants and
plaintiffs in these situations, defendants will generally have the cleanest path
of recovery. This is the case because when the plaintiff seeks recovery in
130. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 113 (1978); Richard A.
Posner, Can Lawyers Solve the Problems of the Tort System, 73 CAL. L. REv. 747, 753 (1985).
131. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
132. See supra text accompanying notes I10-12.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
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tort from the source of the threat, he will have to contend with the problem
of the defendant's voluntary actions being part of the chain of causation.
The plaintiff may also have more difficulty establishing that he was a rea-
sonably foreseeable victim of the threat.
When the defendant seeks recovery from the source of the threat, he
faces no such problem with potential superseding actual cause arguments
and he is more likely to have been a reasonably foreseeable victim of the
threatening behavior. Moreover, the defendant is more likely to be able to
establish intent by the source of the threat and thus successfully sue for the
intentional torts of battery or assault.
In those cases where the threat posed to the defendant was in fact tor-
tious and the source of the threat is available for recovery, the optimal reso-
lution from a liability perspective is for the blameworthy source of the threat
to pay for the harm caused to both the blameless defendant and the blame-
less plaintiff. This is best accomplished, where at all possible, by holding
the defendant liable to the plaintiff and allowing the defendant to include
this liability among the damages that he recovers from the source of the
threat.
For the reasons described above, tort law holds the defendant liable to
the plaintiff in situations like the bank robbery, where the defendant has in-
tentionally harmed the plaintiff in a reasonable effort to respond to a threat
of imminent bodily harm posed by someone other than the plaintiff, and in
private necessity cases like Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. where
the defendant has intentionally harmed the property of the plaintiff in rea-
sonable response to an external threat. 134
VI. CONCLUSION
The above discussion has tried to describe and to illustrate a fascinating
and insufficiently appreciated feature of American tort law-the way in
which it necessarily combines and integrates fundamental goals and analyti-
cal perspectives that are more typically associated with other areas of juri-
sprudence. Tort law combines, in a unique and elegant way, the deterrence
to engage in harmful antisocial behavior that is the hallmark of criminal law
with the provision of compensation to the injured that is the more specia-
lized province of systems of social insurance.
At a more technical level, in order to successfully fulfill its mission and
generate appropriate deterrence and compensation, tort law must fully en-
gage in both unilateral and bilateral analysis. Unilateral analysis, typical of
134. This general approach is mirrored in criminal law, where the Model Penal Code characterizes
otherwise criminal conduct as justified, as long as it satisfies the "lesser of evils" test. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985).
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criminal law and modem schemes of administrative regulation like income
tax, is characterized by a tight focus on the legal status of a single legal per-
son.13 The behavior of parties other than the focus of the inquiry and the
effect that the focus of the inquiry has had on other parties may be relevant
to the analysis. Such considerations, however, are typically relevant only to
the extent that they clarify the legal status of that one party who is the focus
of the inquiry.136
Since tort law shares with criminal law both a deep history and an essen-
tial social interest that involves identifying, defining, and deterring undesir-
able harm producing behaviors, one would expect tort law to be fully en-
gaged in unilateral analysis. And it is.137  Tort law notably engages in
classic unilateral analysis through the intent element of all of the intentional
torts.'13  There the focus of the inquiry is the internal state of mind of the de-
fendant at the time that he engaged in the harm producing behavior.139 The
basic doctrinal tests that have developed around the concept of intent are de-
signed to resolve this unilateral problem. The examination and determina-
tion of the defendant's possible negligent breach of the legal duty of care is
another important example of unilateral analysis in tort law.140
Bilateral analysis is required where the larger legal remedy at stake will,
if imposed, have significant practical consequences for more than one party,
and the specific legal issue to be decided involves the relative merits of those
parties to either receive or suffer that legal remedy. The classic area of bila-
teral jurisprudence is contract law, which must be constantly concemed with
both the appropriateness of imposing damages for breach upon the defendant
and the corresponding appropriateness of granting those same damages to
the plaintiff.141
135. See LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 10 ("The broad aim of the criminal law is, of course, to pre-
vent harm to society-more specifically, to prevent injury to the health, safety, morals and welfare
of the public. This it accomplishes by punishing those who have done harm, and by threatening with
punishment those who would do harm, to others.").
136. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
137. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
139. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) ("[N]egligence is conduct which falls
below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm."); id § 298 ("[T]he care which the actor is required to exercise to avoid being negligent in the
doing of the act is that which a reasonable man in his position, with his information and competence,
would recognize as necessary to prevent the act from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to anoth-
er.").
141. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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Similar to contract law, the dominant remedy in tort law is an involunta-
ry transfer of assets from the defendant to the plaintiff. Since this conse-
quence significantly alters the economic status of both the defendant and the
plaintiff, one would expect tort law to also engage in bilateral analysis-and
it does.142 In fact, tort law is engaged in at least two different kinds of bila-
teral analysis. 143
One kind of bilateral analysis in tort law is required where the doctrine
at issue focuses not just on the status of a single person, as in intent or
breach of duty, but instead regulates a bilateral interaction between the de-
fendant and the plaintiff. An example of this kind of bilateral analysis in tort
law is the basic test for the intentional tort privilege of consent, which places
the traditional reasonable person analysis not in the position of the potential-
ly consenting party, the plaintiff, but instead places it in the position of the
defendant who is observing and interpreting the plaintiffs behavior.'44
Another example is the privilege of self-defense, which determines the exis-
tence of a valid threat, not from the perspective of the source of that threat,
but again from the perspective of the observing and interpreting party.14 5
A second kind of bilateral analysis in tort law is required to insure that
liability is imposed not only when the defendant is an appropriate target of
deterrence, but also only when the plaintiff is an appropriate recipient of
compensation. An example of this second kind of bilateral analysis is the
problem of a plaintiff who can be shown to have subjectively consented to
the defendant's otherwise intentionally tortious behavior but who did not ef-
fectively communicate this consent to the defendant.146 In such cases, the
behavior of the defendant is fully worthy of intentional tort liability, but the
plaintiff, having actually consented, is not an appropriate recipient of dam-
ages.147
Though it might be anticipated, tort law does not consistently respond to
difficult bilateral problems of this second type by simply refraining from
imposing liability. Sometimes, tort law responds to situations in which nei-
ther the plaintiff nor the defendant has acted in a way that justifies their los-
ing the tort claim by holding the defendant liable. One example is the al-
lowance to the defendant of only a very limited privilege in the case of
intentional harm inflicted upon a plaintiff in reasonable response to a threat
142. See supra notes 56-121 and accompanying text.
143. See discussion supra Part Ill.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65,
145. This is consistent with the bilateral analysis employed in contract law, where "objective ma-
nifestations of intent of the party should generally be viewed from the vantage point of a reasonable
person in the position of the other party." PERILLO, supra note 60, at 27; see also Ricketts v. Pa.
R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
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of imminent harm posed to the defendant by someone other than the plain-
tiff.148 The limited privilege provided to a defendant under the doctrine of
private necessity is another.149
In both of these circumstances, the defendant has acted reasonably and
in a manner that society at large would clearly have preferred him to act.
Nevertheless, tort law imposes liability upon the defendant. It does so
through the operation of doctrines that reside deep in the thicket of old, tra-
ditional, fault-based intentional tort law.
While numerous good reasons exist for these intentional law doctrines
to operate as they do, interestingly, they represent clear instances of strict
liability within the context of intentional tort law. This suggests that rather
than being only a relatively modem and philosophically radical alternative to
fault based liability, strict liability may also be an inevitable product of tort
law's need to engage in both unilateral and bilateral analysis.
148. See supra text accompanying note I 10-12.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 113-21.
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